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The Neoconservative War on Modernity:
The Bush Doctrine and its Resistance to Legitimation
Ben Luongo

ABSTRACT
The Bush Doctrine represents a paradigm shift in international security policy. Never
had a foreign policy demonstrated such will through unilateralism, preemptive militarism,
and a sense of exceptionalism. I argue that this shift in policy resists modern international
order in an attempt to reestablish ancient modes of power and control.
The international system maintains order through rules and institutions which are
perceived to be legitimate because they have the consent of the governed. An example of
this would be the UN, where member states engage in a democratic deliberation geared
towards reaching understanding and consensus. However, order breaks down when a
member state fails to recognize the legitimacy of a rule or institution. This was the case
for the Bush Doctrine when the U.S. decided to invade Iraq without a UN resolution.
The Bush Doctrine is the embodiment of neoconservatism, an intellectual
movement influenced by the thoughts of Leo Strauss. What neoconservatism has
inherited from Strauss was a fear of relativism. Strauss’s critique of modernity holds that
liberal society fosters moral relativism which, in turn, destroys the moral fabric of
society. Strauss calls for a revival of antiquity, more specifically a Platonic design of
society, where elites rule through the use of myths which provide society with moral truth
and national purpose.
Neoconservatism has projected Strauss’s war on modernity onto the international
level. The Bush Doctrine assumes its core democratic values to be universal and thus
views consensus building as unnecessary. Rather, deliberating on ‘right’ may enlighten
us to the conventional nature of morality. Therefore, neoconservatism works to
reestablish ancient modes of control through the use of moral absolutes, where the
iii

practice of these values, consequentially, resists international order governed by liberal
principles. As a result, neoconservative policies disrupt international order and isolate the
U.S. from the modern world.

iv

Introduction

Problem/Argument
Global order is maintained principally through compliance with international laws.
Voluntary compliance with international law often reflects the high degree of legitimacy
of international institutions. Legitimacy, which refers to the recognition of the public
right to exercise authority, then, routinely requires deliberation, rational argumentation,
bargaining, and compromise to reach consensus on issues. Over the years, however,
legitimacy has either been contested on various fronts, or manipulated by states to serve
their coercive ends on a domestic and international level.
The most notable example is the Bush Administration’s manipulation of the
United Nations (UN) to justify the launching of the Iraq war.

The UN, which is

perceived as the most legitimate international organization, provides a forum for member
states to engage in debate and deliberation. Here member states deliberate to reach
mutual understanding on issues involving major international threats and the need to
invoke military measures (pursuant to the Chapter VII mandate) to enforce compliance
with the law. The decision to invade Iraq not only reflected the failure to exhaust all
options; it also reflected a violation of the UN charter pursuant to Article 51 (selfdefense).
The problem then is that the Bush Administration used the legitimacy of the UN
to justify or pursue its own coercive ends (principles of the Bush Doctrine: preemptive
action and unilateralism).

This raises an important question: How does the Bush

Adminstration’s manipulation of this legitimacy reflect the ideological underpinnings of
its own resistance of legitimization (processes)? In addressing this question, I argue
that the Bush Doctrine was predicated upon an aggressive national security policy
who moral absolutes took precedence over the need to legitimize authority and
action. These moral absolutes include the spread of democracy for its national

1

security policy, and resulted in a resistance to the legitimation process at the
international level.
I explain the use of moral absolutes in the Bush Doctrine as the constituent
elements of the neoconservative movement and the political philosophy of Leo Strauss.
Strauss was critical of modernity, arguing that liberalism and rationally have exposed
morality as relativistic. He contended that society be governed by educated elites, who
roles were to transmit ‘noble lies’ to the masses.

In this paper, I examine how

neoconservatism incorporated many of the elements of Strauss’s political philosophy,
especially his doubts that liberalism can maintain social order and his preference for
Platonic elites.
However, translating Straussianism into foreign policy, I claim, projects the fear
of relativism and elitist inclinations on the international level. This means the spread of
political and moral absolutism across the globe and justifies the unfettered use of
American power. This became evident during the Security Council’s deliberation on
resolution 1441. Here, as already noted, the U.S. resisted modern international order
when it invaded Iraq without securing the consensus for a new UN resolution
In short, legitimation requires democratic deliberation; but elitism compromises
any domination-free communication arena.

Legitimation also requires rational

communication, not unyielding absolutism. Straussianism works to reestablish ancient
modes of power and control, most notably myths that are self-legitimating, and that helps
to explain the tension between the Bush Doctrine and the (objective) legitimacy of the
UN. A society that demands rational justification is incapable of propagating myths.
Rather, bargaining and compromise expose the relativism in our notions of ‘right’. For a
foreign policy that harbors Straussian tendencies, then, safeguarding the nation against
potential nihilism requires resisting modern conceptions of legitimacy to preserve
American ideals.

Neoconservatism had done just this; it has designed an

uncompromising doctrine of pro-American imperatives that assume self-legitimation.
Ultimately, a foreign policy founded on the fears of relativism cannot engage properly in
modern legitimation. Resisting such international order governed by liberal principles
illustrates the neoconservatives’ willingness to carry on Strauss’s war on modernity.

2

Literature Review

Legitimacy
As stated before, legitimacy refers to the approval of and compliance to rules by those
subject to those rules. Legitimacy is an important concept because the approval of and
compliance to rules maintains social order. However, it is important to mention that
throughout history order has been maintained through different conceptions of
legitimacy. I distinguish between modern and ancient forms. Both imply compliance to
rules but differ on the reasons for that compliance.
Modern forms of legitimacy emerged during the enlightenment and stress the
consent of the governed. John Locke argued that “the liberty of man in society, is to be
under no other legislative power, but the established, by consent, in the commonwealth”.1 Montesque argued that “the government most comfortable to nature, is that
whose particular disposition best aggress with the humour and disposition of the people
in whose favour it is established”.2 Rousseau argued that “the sovereign, being formed
wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary
to theirs”.3 This consent of the governed is formed through a process by which the rule
may become legitimate. This process is called legitimation and is built upon liberal
principles. More specifically, the process follows a democratic deliberation with the
intentions of reaching consensus. Consensus can only be reached if the communication is
rational, meaning that actors provide reasons for their claims. Then all actors bargain and
compromise to reach consensus.4 In general, for modern forms, rules are seen as
legitimate if those subject to the rule approve of the process at which it came into being.
I contrast modern forms of legitimacy with ancient ones. Ancient legitimacy is
different where rules can assume a Bodinian sovereignty, where the compliance to rules
does not require the approval of its coming into being. Rules are followed simply
1

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government. (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, Inc. 1980), 17.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Berkely: University of California Press, 1997), 104.
3
Jean Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract and its Discourses (New York: Dutton and Company, Inc.,
1950), 16-18.
4
Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) p. 448.
2
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because the authority of those rules is assumed. In general, for ancient forms, rules are
thus self-legitimating.

Straussianism
Leo Strauss was a political philosopher whose ideas have influenced much of the
neoconservative movement.

The most important thoughts of Strauss are those

concerning his ‘crisis of modernity’.

His ‘crisis of modernity’ holds that the

enlightenment’s liberalism and scientific progress has exposed morality as conventional
and relativistic.5 For Strauss, relativism in society was a crisis because it ultimately led
to the rejection of all notions of ‘natural right’ where society becomes nihilistic.6 Straus
feared that such nihilism had the power to destroy society.
His philosophy comes from his experience in Germany. He fled the Weimer
Republic before they drafted their constitution after World War I. When Hitler rose to
power he concluded that liberalism inevitably collapses into itself.7 His logic was that
liberalism leads to relativism and relativism logically leads to nihilism, and the rise of
Hitler in the Weimer Republic was proof of this. To safeguard society from history
repeating itself, Strauss calls for a return to the ancients. More specifically, Strauss
advises society to adopt a Platonic design of social hierarchy where the elites rule through
the use of the ‘noble lie’.8 He argued that the masses must believe in certain absolute
truths. These truths took the form of national and religious ideals and provided them with
purpose and moral clarity. Thus, for Strauss, elitism is meant to combat relativism and
maintain social order through the transmission of truths said to be absolute. In the end,
he favored a romanticist aristocratic society, not an enlightened egalitarian one.

5

Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) 12.
Ibid p. 14-20.
7
Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997) 4-6.
8
Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 102.
6
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Neoconservatism
Neoconservatism is an intellectual movement that was born as a reaction to the
counterculture of the 1960s. Neoconservatives saw counterculture as the breakdown of
social and moral order and viewed themselves as the culture warriors who would
reestablish order through orthodoxy and tradition.9 They were also vehemently anticommunist and adopted uncompromising and militaristic foreign policies against Soviet
expansionism which they would pursue after gaining ranks in the Reagan
administration.10 In general, neoconservatism emphasizes the need for social order and
espouses democratic principles.
However, neoconservatives found their home in the George W. Bush
administration and provided the philosophical foundation for the Bush Doctrine, a foreign
policy idealistic in principle yet militaristic in practice.11 There are four main pillars of
the Bush Doctrine. The first and most important one is democratization. Democracy is
the core ideal to which the rest of the Bush Doctrine’s principles stem from. Democracy
is regarded as a universal truth that all mankind deserves and America should lead the
struggle.12 The second pillar is militarist primacy. According to the Bush Doctrine,
American might is unmatched and should be used to actively to reshape the world rather
than used passively as deterrence. The third pillar is preemption because the Bush
Doctrine views threats of the 21st century no longer to enemy states but rather terrorist
organizations that cannot be deterred.

The fourth pillar is unilateralism out of the

necessity to act quickly and decisively when other ally nations might hesitate to act.13
The Bush Doctrine, as the embodiment of the neoconservative movement, has
Straussian undertones to it. The Bush Doctrine becomes elitist in the Straussian sense
through its core principle that democracy is an absolute truth. However, a foreign policy

9

Irving Kristol “Countercultures,” Neoconservatism: An Autobiography of an Idea (New York: The Free
Press, 1995) 146
10
Gary Dorrien, Imperial Design: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (New York: Routledge,
New York) 8-10.
11
Mearsheimer, John. “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism Versus Neo-conservatism”. 21-042005. www.openDemocracy net. p. 3
12
The White House. “The National Security Strategy of the United State of America”, September 20th
2002; available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>
13
Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine”, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 118 N.3 2003
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that assumes some values to be absolutely true see legitimation as undermining the
natural authority of those values.

Analytical Framework/Objectives

Neoconsersativism versus legitimacy: The Bush adminstration and the UN
First, the paper must evidence how neoconservatism has resisted modern legitimation.
To do this I will demonstrate how the Bush Doctrine has resisted proper protocols in the
Security Council’s deliberation on resolution 1441. This will be done by describing how
UN deliberations are a process of legitimation using a Habermasian model, one that is
built on validating claims. According to Habermas, claims are validated upon them being
factually true (truth), that they conform to basic norms of how the social world should act
(rightness), and that they are sincere (truthfulness). To evidence how the Bush Doctrine
resists legitimation, then, entails demonstrating how it did not satisfy validity claims
during UN deliberations. I will demonstrate how the U.S. could not validate their
decision to invade on any of the validity dimensions of truth, rightness, and truthfulness,
thus demonstrating that neoconservatism does resist modern legitimation.

Moral Authority versus Relativism: Neoconservatives and the Fear of Relativsism
The next task is to link neoconservatism to Straussianism. To do this I will demonstrate
that the neoconservative movement has adopted Strauss’s fear of relativism that casts
suspicions on liberalism and calls for cultural elites. This will be done through an
historical examination of the neoconservative movement during two periods.
The first period will be the neoconservatives’ reaction to the counterculture of the 1960s
and 1970s. They viewed the permissive egalitarianism and cultural relativism of the
counterculture as a disintegration of values.

The paper will demonstrate how

neoconservatives saw this as evidence that liberalism was incapable of maintaining social
order and that the neoconservative solution was for educated elites to reestablish cultural
orthodoxy.
6

The second period will be their rise to power in the Reagan administration and their
efforts to overturn détente. Neoconservatives viewed détente not as peace between
nations but as a sign of ideological malaise and became concerned that America had lost
its convictions. The paper will demonstrate how neoconservatives blamed this tolerance
and diplomatic passivity on the liberal intelligentsia and, after gaining ranks in the
Reagan administration, worked to reconstitute America’s unique role in international
politics.

Moral Authority Undermining the Governing Liberalist Principles of International Order
The last task is to explain that the Bush Doctrine is a neoconservative document that
harbors the same fear of relativism and that it is this fear of relativism that resisted
legitimation in the UN. First the paper will evidence the fear of relativism in the Bush
Doctrine through its belief that democratic values are absolute and universal. Then the
paper will demonstrate how the fear of relativism resists legitimation on the grounds that
legitimation requires the compromise and bargaining of values. The Bush Doctrine
becomes elitist in the Straussian sense by working to reestablish ancient modes of power
and control through the use of myth, where myths are self-legitimating because their truth
or rightness is natural or inherent.

Structure
The paper will be divided into five chapters. Chapter one will explain the theory of
modern legitimacy and demonstrate how the U.S. legal argument for war could not
validate its claim to be conceived as legitimate under modern standards. Chapter two
will discuss Leo Strauss’s critique of modernity where his fear of relativism casts doubts
on liberalism and attempts to reestablish ancient modes of power and control through
cultural elites. Chapter three will discuss the link between neoconservatism and
Straussianism through the fear of relativism. Chapter four will explain what makes the
Bush Doctrine a distinctively neoconservative document by providing evidence that it
harbors a Straussian fear of relativism.

Chapter five, then, explains that the Bush
7

Doctrine’s inability to validate the decision for war in the UN is explained by its fear of
relativism and why this fear ultimately resists modern conceptions of legitimation.
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Chapter 1: Legitimation

Introduction
Modern forms of legitimacy, compared to ancient forms, require reaching consent
through a democratic deliberative process. Conflict arises when this process breaks down
and when a member of this process undermines the need for consent. This chapter will
demonstrate that the Bush Doctrine does just this.
First, the chapter will explain what legitimacy is and the role it has in the world.
Second, it will relate legitimacy to the United Nations and explain why the UN works as
a form of legitimation. Third, this chapter will explain how the Bush Doctrine has
resisted legitimation by critiquing the U.S.’s legal argument for military action against
Iraq and its inability to satisfy validity claims in the UN.

The Relevance of the Enlightenment
Scholars agree on a rather general meaning for the concept of legitimacy.

Weber

provides us with a concept of legitimacy in its most basic form. For Weber, any authority
is legitimate when its subjects desire and comply with its rules.14

Though Weber

provides us with different forms of legitimate rule, those being traditional, charismatic,
rational and legal, the greater question is where an authority’s legitimacy derives from?
It is important, then, to turn to the Enlightenment because it was during this period that
society began to question the authority of rules and institutions and provided us with a
modern framework of legitimacy.
The Enlightenment was progressive and championed liberal ideals that were
completely discontinuous with ancient and medieval modes of thinking. Modern thought

14

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947), 124132.

9

had a much more optimistic view of human nature which could be seen in Immanuel
Kant’s short essay, What is Enlightenment?:
“Enlightnment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s
ability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Selfincurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of
resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude!
“Have courage to use your own reason!” – that is the motto of the
enlightenment.”15
The optimism of modernity’s enlightened thinkers had led it to embrace a number of
liberal tenets such as individual autonomy, scientific rationalism, free market economy,
etc. In general, modern thinkers emphasized the individual at the center of society, where
now the authority of laws and institutions would have to be recognized by the individual.
The best way to demonstrate this is by reviewing some major thinkers of this time.
This can best be evidenced through John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,
which outlines a political society based on the social contract. Locke asserts the role of
the individual in the legitimation of a political system under the idea that the rule of
government is legitimate only under the consensus of those governed.
“The liberty of man in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but the
established, by consent, in the common-wealth; nor under the dominion of any
will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the
trust put into it.”16
This is an important concept for Locke because this illustrates that each man has
“property in his own person”17, meaning that men are free from arbitrary rule from any
other. Furthermore, the idea of “property in his own person” assumes each person’s self15

Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment.” In The Portable Enlightenment Reader, ed. Isaac Kramnick,
(New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 1.
16
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government. (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, Inc. 1980), 17.
17
Ibid., 19.
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determination, that each person determines their own destiny and thus reserves the right
to revolution if that law is in breach of the social contract. Locke has placed consent-ofthe-governed at the center of social order, where the legitimacy of authority is
constructed only through the consensus of the social constract.
This contractarianism is evident also in Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws written
in 1748. He wrote: “Better is it to say that the government most comfortable to nature, is
that whose particular disposition best aggress with the humour and disposition of the
people in whose favour it is established.18” Montesquieu also offers us a system of
checks and balances to counter power monopolies in government and ensure that policy
reflects those it governs. “There would be an end of everything, where the same man or
same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers”.19
Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote The Social Contract and its Discourses in 1762
where he to places much importance on consensus. He argued that only the individual,
not the state, knows best of his or her own interest, thus the state’s power derives from
those individuals it meant to govern, still allowing their own self-determination. This
would place the state as the subject to the will of the people, rather than the people as
subject to the will of the state, a concept Rousseau would call the ‘general will’.
“Again, the Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it,
neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; and consequently the
sovereign power need give no guarantee to its subjects because it is impossible
for the body to wish to hurt all its members.”20
Democratic rule is formed through Rousseau’s ‘general will’, dictating the state’s policy.
Many other enlightenment thinkers saw that the state should reflect the general will of the
people and that a democratic process was the appropriate method for actualizing that
general will. If the state was to be legitimate, some democratic process was necessary for
the state to reflect those it meant to govern.
18

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Berkely: University of California Press, 1997), 104.
Ibid., 152.
20
Jean Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract and its Discourses (New York: Dutton and Company, Inc.,
1950), 16-18.
19
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However, a democratic process could only thrive under the practice of other
ideals that safeguard self-determination and thus act as main ingredients for democracy.
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty notes two important concepts for and healthy liberal
democracy, those being freedom of speech and the harm principle. For Mill, freedom of
speech was necessary, not only in a democracy, but necessary for the discovery of truth.
Freedom of speech allowed for debate and dialogue amongst members of society. Only
through dialogue and the exchange of ideas could the people determine which ideas were
right and wrong. He wrote:
“We can never be sure that the opinions we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion;
and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”21 The second concept in On
Liberty, is the harm principle. Mill claimed that the only reason to assert power over an
individual is to protect the well-being of another.
“The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign.”22
All members of society have the right to act as they saw fit until there action intervened
with another’s. This personal sovereignty extends into two spheres of an individual’s
life, his mind and body. Not only are individuals free from physical coercion but also
from the mental coercion or persuasion.

This personal sovereignty safeguards the

individuals right to self-determination by allowing that individual to recognize and
actualize what is in their interest from others and allowing others to do the same. It is
this notion of self-determination, or at least participation, that frames the notion of
legitimacy.

21
22

John Stewart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Barnes and Nobel Books, 2004), 17.
Ibid., 10.
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Habermasian Legitimacy
Today legal scholars have better articulated what legitimacy is and what the process of
reaching legitimate rule looks like.

Thomas M. Franck argues that legitimacy is a

“property of a rule or rule-making institutions which itself exerts a pull towards
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule
or institution has come into being and operates in the accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process.”23 He accounts for all of the characteristics of a law that add
to its legitimacy, those being: determinacy, symbolic, coherence, and adherence.24
However, while Franck offers a thorough explanation of why international law is for the
most part obeyed, he does not explain the mechanics of how legitimate rule is produced.
It is important then to turn to Habermas.

Communicative Rationality
Habermas provides us with a very thorough understanding of legitimacy and credits
modernity for its “courage to use reason”. Habermas sees modernity as a project worth
‘finishing’. His universal pragmatics holds that the rationality that has built our modern
society should be further used to substantiate our universal impulse to communicate,
where intersubjective understanding is made possible. Only then, through the processes
of mutually desired understanding and agreement, can society recognize mutual
“normative backgrounds”.25

For Habermas, rational communication binds society

together. Much like Mill’s belief that freedom of speech was necessary for reaching
understanding in a democratic process, so to does Habermas hold that much weight for
speech and language.
Habermas is most known for his work on communicative rationality which is a
model of communication based on intersubjective understanding through rationally
justified speech acts. At the heart of this theory is the role of language:
23

Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (England: Oxford University Press, 1990),
3-26.
24
Ibid.
25
Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 3.
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“If we were not in a position to refer to a model of speech, we could not even
begin to analyze what it means for two subjects to come to an understanding with
one another. Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech.
Naturally, speech and understanding are not related to one another as means to
and end. But we can explain the concept of reaching understanding only if we
specify what it means to use sentences with communicative intent.”26
For Habermas, speech is not only necessary for reaching understanding, “understanding
is the inherent telos of human speech”. However, we can reach understanding only when
our intentions are rationally based.

Habermas gives rationality a central role in

communication and refers to the intentions of our speech acts. What we express to other
participants in communication must be rationalized and justified; we must have reasons
for it.
“The rationality inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively
achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons. And the rationality of
those how participate in this communicative practice is determined whether, if
necessary, they could, under suitable circumstances, provide reasons for their
expressions.”27
Only by providing reasons for what we express can others understand our expressions
and regard them at valid. Habermas calls these validity claims which could be assessed
on three dimensions: truth, rightness, and truthfulness.
“In uttering a sentence the speaker makes a claim which, were he to make it
explicitly, might take the form: “It is true that p,” or “It is right that a,” or “I mean
what I say when I here a now utter s” (where p stands for a proposition, a for a
description of an action, and s for a first person sentence). A validity claim is
26

Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society,
Volume I (Boston, Beacon Press, 1981), 287.
27
Ibid., 17.
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equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of an utterance are
fulfilled.”28
By mutual recognition of these dimensions in validity claims, the hearer’s criticism, if
any, articulates the dimension in question back to the speaker and does so “in light of
reasons or grounds” and illustrates “insight and understanding.”29

Such consensus

achieved by validity claims results in a communicative action.

For Habermas,

communicative rationality creates an “orientation toward reaching understanding” which
transforms consensus into action. In other words communicative action is the movement
from communication to action coordinated by validity claims.
“Reach understanding functions as a mechanism for coordinating actions only
through the participants in interaction coming to an agreement concerning the
claimed validity of their utterances, that is, through intersubjectively recognizing
the validity claims they reciprocally raise.”30
Habermas makes a distinction between this communicative action, which serves as a
social cohesive, and a more infectious model he calls instrumental.

Where a

communicative model promotes sociality and relates individuals to each other as “subject
to subject” and having “shared expectations, beliefs, and norms, Instrumental models
focus on the individual and his or her relationship to “external nature, as subject to object,
oriented toward its efficient mastery.”31 Instrumental action is designed to advance one’s
own intentions rather than promote understanding.

Instrumental action ignores and

defeats the ‘telos’ inherent in our use of language and leaves no foundation for social
order. Only a model based on mutual understanding offers the building blocks for an
integrated society.
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Deliberative Legitimacy
The argument for communicative rationality articulates an important principle that
habermas calls the discourse principle or (D): “Just those actions norms are valid to
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse.”32
(D) operates as a specification for Habermas’s condition that the validation of claims
leads to consensus. This principle allows Habermas to employ his communicative model
into a legal theory of legitimation.
However, rational discourse is often times not enough to produce social order,
especially in culturally diverse societies. If humankind was naturally inclined to act
towards social order, than we would not need notions of right to govern our actions. This
is not the case and where discourse falls short, law maintains the standard of rational
communication and thus social order.
“Through communicative action the rationality potential of language for functions
of social integration is tapped, mobilized and unleashed in a course of social
evolution. Modern law steps in to fill the functional gaps in social order whose
integrative capacities are overtaxed. The tension between validity and facticity,
already built into informal everyday practice in virtue of the ideal content of the
pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action, becomes more acute in the
validity dimension of modern law.”33
Modern law “fills the functional gap” of civil society’s discourse by providing a dual
structure to law. Where the civil society attempts to reach consensus communicatively
and uphold its claims based on mere validity, law provides a duel structure for the
compliance of its rules: “Its positivity and its claim to rational acceptability”.34 Not only
is law rational but also enforceable and thus binds facticity with validity. Ultimately,
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Habermas believes that “moral content can spread throughout a society along the
channels of legal regulation”35
Law becomes rationally acceptable through Habermas’s democracy principle,
which is a legal variation of (D). The democracy principle states that: “only those
statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) of all citizens
in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.”36 The
assent that Habermas is referring to is the “democratic opinion and will-formation” of
civil society reached through discourse and rational communication.37 This assent brings
with it a will that is distinctively legal, a civic motivation to bind the rationality of
communication with the facticity of law. Haberams refers to this will as communicative
power. Communicative power works to influence and inform governance by processing
the general will through democratic structures, that would hopefully, once
institutionalized as law, reflect the general will and its rationality that motivated it
originally, whereby its legitimacy originates.
“The democratic procedure for the production of law evidently forms the only
postmetaphysical source of legitimacy. But what provides this procedure with its
legitimating force? Discourse theory answers this question with a simple, and at
first glance, unlikely answer: democratic procedure makes it possible for issues
and contributions, information and reasons to float freely; it secures a discursive
character for political will-formation; and it thereby grounds the fallibilistic
assumption that results issuing from proper procedures are more or less
reasonable.”38
Habermas’s legitimation of rules and law comes full circle with his advocating for
modernity’s completion and the upholding of enlightenment ideals. It is the practice of
these ideals, reason, communication, democracy etc that not only describes what
legitimate rule may look like, but also where it comes from.
35
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The Legal Argument for War and Resisting Legitimation
I will use the UN to contextualize legitimation for it engages its members in democratic
deliberative decision-making and generally enjoys a healthy level of compliance with its
rules. This section will critique the U.S.’s legal argument in the UN that Iraq was
developing weapons of mass destruction to be used in conjunction with its ties to terrorist
networks with the intent of attacking the United States and therefore constituted an
imminent threat that justified military action against Iraq. The argument in this section is
that Bush Doctrine resisted legitimation by failing to satisfy validity requirements (truth,
rightness, truthfulness) necessary for creating understanding and consensus in the UN.
As a result, no communicative power materialized to bind the general will into law,
however, the U.S. would invade Iraq anyway.
The U.S.’s argument for preemptive action against Iraq was based on the idea that
Iraq was advancing its development of WMDs and that it would exploit its supposed ties
to terrorist networks to carry out an attack on the U.S. Bush outline this claim in a speech
he delivered October 6th 2008.
“Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi
regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all
development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The
Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces
chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given
shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people. The
entire world has witnessed Iraq's eleven-year history of defiance, deception and
bad faith.”39
Bush’s speech asserted that Iraq stockpiled atleast 60,000 liters of anthrax, “thousands of
tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas”, and was
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“rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons”.40
Bush further warned that these deadly agents need not be deployed by conventional
military means but rather could be concealed and detonated by hand by terrorist agents.
“And, of course, sophisticated delivery systems aren't required for a chemical or
biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist
or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it. And that is the source of our urgent
concern about Saddam Hussein's links to international terrorist groups. Over the
years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror
organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed
or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans.”41
Bush specified in the above statement that the danger of WMDs in Iraq was linked to
Iraq’s ties to terrorists organizations and was sure to make this case to the UN.
In his address to to the UN, Bush argued that Iraq “admitted to producing tens of
thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud
warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks” and that “U.N. inspectors believe Iraq
has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed
to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce
biological weapons.”42 His speech then claimed that “Iraq continues to shelter and
support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western
governments.”43
The U.S.’s legal argument (and thus there claim which requires validation from
all parties) was twofold: First, it assumed that Iraq would “supply these weapons to
terrorist allies”44 and therefor U.S. military action was appropriate out of self-defense.
Second, Iraq had breached UN resolutions 686, 687, and 688, under the accusation that
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Iraq continued to reppress its own people and still held ties to terrorist networks. These
arguments will be examined first through validity claims

Self-Defense and ‘Truth’ Dimension of Validty
The legal argument for invasion for the reason that Iraq posed an imminent threat failed
to satisfy basic validity requirements discussed in a Habermasian legitimation process.
First, this claim did not satisfy the ‘truth’ dimension of validity claims that required an
emperical and factual argument for the use of miltary force against Iraq. This dimension
required evidence for both assertions that Iraq was furthering its development of WMDs
and that it held strong ties to terrorist organizations. None of these assertions could be
factually backed.
First, the White House asserted that Iraq was purchasing uranium from Africa as
evidence of their nuclear ambitions. However, CIA intellegence stated that “no contracts
had been signed with Iraq or other "rogue states" after 1997, and that no uranium ore had
been shipped to those states.”45 Even before Bush’s address to the General Assembly, the
CIA told the State Department that there was no factual basis to this claim. The White
House also asserted that Iraq had built new factories to further develop biological and
chemical weaponry. However, according to the George Tenet of the CIA, there was “no
confirming intelligence” of any such developments and nothing suggested that these
factories were developing any weapons. Tenet stated that the claim that these were
factories developing weapons was so unsubstantiated that if an invasion occurred with the
intention of targeting military complexes “we’d be going in there blind.”46 There was
very little evidence for the White House to validate the ‘truth’ dimension of their claim.
To this day, no weapons were found.
The second claim, that Saddam Hussein harbored terrorists or had any close ties
to Al Qaeda, lacked sufficient material evidence also. Many in Bush’s cabinet could not
make a strong case for a link between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Richard Armitage, Deputy
45
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Secretary of State, said that “A lot of folks out of the administration have spent a lot of
time and energy trying to tie Iraq and Al Qaeda together, but thus far it hasn’t been able
to be done.”47 The 9/11 Commission Report would later come out and reject the claim
that there were any collaborative efforts between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
“But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever
developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen any
evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying
out any attacks against the United States”48
In general both claims that Iraq was acquiring and developing WMDs and that it had
close ties to terrorist networks were unsubstantiated and thus were not valid claims.

Self-Defense and the ‘Truthfulness’ Dimension of Validity
The White House’s claim falls short also on the ‘truthfulness’ dimension, the dimension
that requires all parties to demonstrate sincere interest in reaching understanding and
consensus. Documentation has emerged exposing possibilities that U.S. officials have
manipulated or fixed intelligence concerning Iraq. The most egregious case was the
Downing Street memo which revealed that the “intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy.”49 This type of ‘fixing’ was made public when George Tenet stated
that Bush aids ignored CIA intelligence concerning Iraq’s possible WMDs. The CIA’s
National Intellegence Estimate never concluded that Iraq was an ‘imminent threat’.50
After it was clear that Bush aids ignored CIA intelligence, Wesley Clark has said that
'”We need an independent, comprehensive investigation into the administration's
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handling of the intelligence leading to war in Iraq”. Clark was approached by President
Bush on September 12th asking for links between Iraq and al Qaeda. Bush told him “See
if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way”.51 The New York Times article wrote:
“Gen. Wesley K. Clark delivered a searing indictment of the Bush administration
on Friday, asserting that its “headlong rush to war” was based on twisted facts and
had violated the nation's democratic principles “with dire consequences for our
security”.52
Defense Dept. Inspector General Tom Gimble stated that top Pentagon officials misled
the White House concerning intelligence by exaggerating ties between Iraq and al Qaeda
and by withholding intelligence from agencies that challenged Pentagon intelligence.53
Most cases concerning the manipulation of data and twisting intelligence is traced back to
the Office of Special Planning. Karen Kwiatkowski, a Petagon officer wrote what she
witnessed in the OSP:
“I witnessed neoconservative agenda bearers within OSP usurp measured and
carefully considered assessments, and through suppression and distortion of
intelligence analysis promulgate what were in fact falsehoods to both Congress
and the executive office of the president.”54
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Scott McClellan, former White House Press Secretary to Bush, has recently said that “in
the permanent campaign era, it was all about manipulating sources of public opinion to
the president's advantage.”55 He wrote in his book:
“Our lack of candor and honesty in making the case for war would later provoke a
partisan response from our opponents that, in its own way, further distorted and
obscured a more nuanced reality. Another cycle of deception would cloud the
public’s ability to see larger, underlying important truths that are critical to
understand in order to avoid the same problems in the future.”56
In March of 2006 the New York Times published the contents of a confidential memo
written by David Manning, Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser. The NY Times article
wrote:
“But behind closed doors, the president was certain that war was inevitable.
During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made
clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade
Iraq without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors failed
to find unconventional weapons.”57
In that memo Manning said that “Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the
military planning.”58 Overall, enough documentation has exposed suspect methods of
data gathering and policy planning on behalf of the U.S. to question the ‘truthfulness’
validity of the legal argument for invasion on grounds of self-defense.
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Breach of UN Resolutions and the ‘Rightness’ Dimension of Validity
The U.S. legal argument of invasion for reason of Iraq’s breach of UN resolutions did not
satisfy the ‘rightness’ dimension, the dimension that requires the claim to adhere to basic
norms of how the social world should operate. ‘Rightness’ adds an epistemic dimension
to moral and legal decisions or rules, where notions of legal justice and morality become
interlaced. “An agreement about norms or actions that has been attained discursively
under ideal conditions carries more than merely authorizing force: it warrants the
rightness of moral judgment”59 Habermas makes a case then that rightness pertains to the
compliance of rules as long as those rules are consensually accepted by society.
Rightness in this legal argument then pertains to compliance of legal protocols when a
state in question is in breach of UN resolutions. What then is the protocol? According to
the UN charter Chapter 7, article 39:
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”60
This article states that only the UN Security Council may determine a threat to the peace,
not an individual member state. This article would discredit the U.S.’s justification for
invasion which was based on the argument that resolution 1441 somehow authorized
military use. Resolution 1441 states: “that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it
will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations”.61
This point however, does not authorize any particular member state the power to use
military force. John Negroponte even acknowledged in his statement to the Security
Council.
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“this Resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect
to the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach, reported to the Council by
UNMOVIC, the IAEA, or a member state, the matter will return to the Council
for discussions as required in paragraph 12.”62
These two legal arguments by the U.S. did not satisfy all validity dimensions and thus
could not reach understanding and consensus during the UN deliberations.

Of the

permanent five members of the Security Council, France, China and Russia were strongly
against the premature invasion of Iraq. France threatened to veto any military action
taken. China aligned itself with France in advocating for further inspections. Russia was
willing to back the U.S. if the situation in Iraq did not change but rested on continued
weapons inspections and multilateral consensus. Furthermore, of the temporary ten, the
only members that supported the use of force ware Bulgaria and Spain. Of the total
fifteen members of the Security Council, U.S. ambitions to invade Iraq were backed only
by the UK, Spain and Bulgaria. This was not enough given the nine out of fifteen
supermajority required to pass a resolution. Despite no passage of any resolution, the
U.S. invaded Iraq on March 20th 2003. Kofi Annan reported to the BBC after reviewing
the charter and indicated that the invasion “was not in conformity with the UN charter
from our point of view, from the charter’s point of view, it was illegal.63
The failure of the U.S. to reach consensus, especially the absence of ‘truthfulness’
during decision-making, doesn’t illustrate misunderstanding or miscommunication, it
illustrates outright instrumental and strategic action, which according to Habermas is a
parasitic form of communication and obstructs a process designed with communicative
intent. This further comes to light when the U.S. was “determined to invade” despite the
lack of consensus, which indicates the Bush Doctrine’s strong resistence to legitimation.
What then is the reason for this resistance?
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The paper will argue that this resistance can be explained by examining Leo
Strauss’s critique of modernity because it is his thought that has been the most influential
for the neoconservative movement. In particular, it is his fear of relativism that has been
internalized by the neoconservative movement and embedded in the Bush Doctrine that
resists the modern legitimation of rules.
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Chapter 2: Leo Strauss

Introduction
The thoughts of Leo Strauss have received great attention, especially after the Iraq
invasion. More and more scholars have found it necessary to explore the relationship
between Straus and the neoconservatives, and indeed there is one. James Atlas was one
of the first to report on Strauss’s influence saying that “the Bush Administration is rife
with Straussians.”64

Jim Lobe later wrote “Strauss is a popular figure among the

neoconservatives. Adherents of his ideas include prominent figures both within and
outside the administration…Strauss' philosophy is hardly incidental to the strategy and
mindset adopted by these men.”65 Anne Norton, a student of many of the Straussians
such as Joseph Cropsey and Ralph Lerner, argues in respect to Straussians that “they
were bound by politics as well: a distinctly and distinctively conservative politics. They
have come to power and influenced the character of governance in the United States.”66
Shadia Drury writes “The power and influence of Strauss’s students in Washington is a
well-documented fact.”67 It is because of his influence on the neoconservative movement
that it is so important to turn to his philosophy.
Strauss can be viewed as a sort of postmodernist given his critique of liberalism
and rationalism in a modern era. For Strauss, both rationalism and liberalism cultivate a
dangerous relativism that could destroy society’s moral fabric.

If modernity is the

problem, then society must unearth the ways of its ancestors, which requires reversing
our enlightenment and embracing ancient modes of power and control. Rather than
building society on a foundation of reason, elites would be trusted to provide the masses
64
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with information concerning morality and meaning. For Strauss, it is the ancients rather
than the moderns that have built a stable society given their ability to safeguard against
relativism. This chapter will focus on two aspects that are important to understand
Strauss’s political thought: 1) his suspicions of liberalism, and 2) his preference for
cultural elites.

The Ancient and Modern Dichotomy
A key feature of Strauss’s political thought is his dichotomy between the ancients and the
moderns, more specifically the departure from antiquity and the crisis of modernity, a
debate that is essentially at the heart of Straussianism. This dichotomy is not to be
understood as an evolution of an ancient world to a modern one, but rather a
transformation of moral and political understanding through a new conception of nature.
According to Strauss:
Traditional natural law is primarily and mainly an objective ‘rule and measure’, a
binding order prior to, and independent of, the human will, while modern natural
law is, or tends to be, primarily and mainly a series of ‘rights’, of subjective
claims, originating in the human will.68
The antiquarian conception of nature was a world order in which human behavior would
act in accordance with. Conversely, modern conceptions of nature departed from the
subjugation of man’s will and would champion what Strauss would call a ‘conquest of
nature’.

This conquest was, for Strauss, a “present-day tyranny” of progress made

possible through the advancement of science and knowledge. What seemed unnatural
and perverse to the ancients would now dominate present-day political philosophy ─ that
man would rule over nature.69

It is the opposing notions of nature, and therefore

ultimately opposing epistemological understanding of moral behavior, that makes distinct
modernity from antiquity.
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Strauss traces the advent of modernity back to Machiavelli as the first modern
philosopher.

Strauss would call this the first wave of modernity which would be

developed further by the Enlightenment.70 Machiavelli’s distinct conception of nature
can be understood through the notion of virtue. As Strauss puts it:
The Traditional approach was based on the assumption that morality is something
substantial: that it is a force in the soul of man, however ineffective it may be
especially in the affairs of states and kingdoms.

Against this assumption

Machiavelli argues as follows: virtue can be practiced only within society; man
must be habituated to virtue by laws, customs and so forth.

Men must be

educated to virtue by human beings.71
What makes Machiavelli’s conception of virtue modern is his humanism. This is a
departure from ancient virtue in that it no longer precedes, and therefore provides,
guiding principles for the good of society. Rather, virtue is achieved now through actions
taken for the ends of society, despite how those actions might be viewed in terms of
ancient virtue. Modern political philosophy thus has transformed the notion of virtue into
a construction no longer to be understood in terms of morality but rather in terms of the
civic. The argument thus becomes: what is virtuous is so because it is good for the
city.72,73
It is important to note, for the purpose of this paper, what is crucial to
understanding Machiavelli’s virtú ─ his critical stance towards religion, specifically
Christianity. According to Machiavelli:
Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative men, rather than men of
action… But though it looks as if the world were become effeminate, and if
heaven were powerless, this undoubtably is due rather to the pusillanimity of
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those who have interpreted our religion in terms of laissez faire, not in terms of
virtú.74
Christianity glorified nature’s rule over man and was therefore antithetical to virtue. On
the other hand, civic virtue was aggressive and passionate; it drove men to action.
It is here that we understand Strauss’s distinction between the moderns and the
ancients. Modernity’s conception of virtue is no longer compatible with antiquity’s
political philosophy. By constructing virtue in terms of the civic, the moderns have
transformed political philosophy from what was once antiquity’s purely reflective
pursuits to now be bonded with a present-day praxis. Political philosophy would finally
waken in modernity to find man ruling over nature.

The Crisis of Modernity
Modernity is central to much of Strauss’s work and, again understood as a present-day
political philosophy and a new conception of nature, would become a major point of his
criticism. Strauss is well known for advising a return to the ancients. Strauss writes:
It is not self-forgetting and pain-loving antiquarianism nor self-forgetting and
intoxicating romanticism which induces us to turn with passionate interest, with
unqualified willingness to learn, toward the political thought of classical antiquity.
We are impelled to do so by the crisis of our time, the crisis of the West.75
To better understand why modernity or the West was in crisis it is important to start with
the thoughts of those who first recognized a crisis thus laying the foundation for much of
Strauss’s work. Those thoughts belong to Nietzsche. In fact much of Strauss’s work was
in response to the ideas of Nietzsche. Strauss’s letter to Karl Löwith illustrates this as he
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said “Nietzsche so dominated and bewitched me between my 22nd and 30th years, that I
literally believed everything that I understood of him”.76
It is The Birth of Tragedy where Strauss was introduced to Nietzsache’s crisis of
the West.77 Nietzsche uses Socrates as a symbol of false hope that true knowledge is
attainable, that we can understand the self and use knowledge to improve the self.
According to Nietzsche:
By contrast with this practical pessimism, Socrates is the prototype of the
theoretical optimist who, with his faith that the nature of things ca be fathomed,
ascribes to knowledge and insight the power of a panacea, while understanding
error as the evil par excellence…But science, spurred by its powerful illusion,
speeds irresistibly toward its limits where its optimism, concealed in the essence
of logic, suffers shipwreck.78
For Nietzsche we can never know things-in-themselves including ourselves. Humanity
was promised, by science and knowledge, an improvement of our condition only to find
the loss of meaning for our existence.79
Strauss’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil further displays
what is at the heart of Nietzsche’s crisis ─ our perspectivism. For Nietzsche, there is no
objective judgment of truth but rather there are several ways to see the world based on
each person’s perspective of truth. Nietzsche provides three assumptions:


Everything is interpretation or construction



Constructed truths are ‘life-giving’



No constructed truth is everlasting
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Thus we understand how knowledge destroys the meanings humanity lives by.
Understanding that truth is nothing more than construction and temporary enlightens us
about our perspectivism, and we become nihilistic. 80
Strauss’s interpretation of Nietzsche does not end with an existential dilemma but
pursues this nihilism further into the moral and political. The sciences of modernity
provide the knowledge of other notions of ‘right’, harboring a sense of conventionalism,
the “contention that the variety of notions of right proves the nonexistence of natural right
or the conventional character of all right.”81 Strauss’s conventionalism recognizes the
varying notions of right spatially but focuses more so on there temporal nature; notions of
right are subject not only to location but have also been subject to the whims of historical
conditions. In Strauss’s words:
The fundamental premise of conventionalism is, then, nothing other than the idea
of philosophy as the attempt to grasp the eternal. The modern opponents of
natural right reject precisely this idea. According to them, all human thought is
historical and hence unable ever to grasp anything eternal. Whereas, according to
the ancients, philosophizing means to leave the cave, according to our
contemporaries all philosophizing essentially belongs to a “historical world”,
“culture,” “civilization,” “Weltanschauung,” that is, to what Plato had called the
cave. We shall call this view “historicism.82
This historicism, a particular form of positive science in search for objective truths,
would confess rather our perspectivism, destroying all normative universal principles and
declare a state of nihilism for the new world.83

Here we understand the crisis of

modernity in Strauss’s thought. The conquest over nature is humanity’s attempt to
improve its situation through scientific understanding which inadvertently results in the
historicization of morality. Machiavelli’s modernizing of political philosophy produced
the foundation for the second and third wave of modernity, reaching its climax in
80
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Nietzsche’s nihilism and illustrating our greatest irony ─ “The attempt to make man
absolutely at home in this world ended in man’s becoming absolutely homeless.”84 By
transforming virtue from the moral to the civic we paved the way for a destructive
nihilism and lost our ability to act morally in the city.

For Strauss, historicism’s

destruction of all natural right authorities would elevate itself as the new and only
authority of relativism, leaving humanity in moral loath and despair.

Modernity and American Liberalism
It is important, then, to understand Strauss’s crisis of modernity in context of the West’s
liberal traditions (in particular the U.S.), for they are closely related.

For Strauss,

liberalism is very much a part of modernity. In fact modernity assumes liberalism, thus
also assumes an integral part for liberalism in modernity’s crisis.85

Catherine and

Michael Zuckert, both former students of Strauss, write:
“What is needed, in other words, is Enlightenment, that is, the spread within
society of truths discerned by philosophy and the replacement of old opinions,
understood now as mere prejudices, by these new truths. Philosophy thus became
particularly eager to have an effect ─ to remake the world. As Strauss puts it,
philosophy, while not giving up its aspiration to truth, also becomes propaganda,
the conscious effort to reshape opinion through public teaching. America was
founded by men who were heirs to this project.86
Machiavelli’s ‘modern project’ was inherited by John Locke, Adam Smith, Immanuel
Kant, Voltaire and other prominent Enlightenment thinkers who would further develop
modernity and champion the liberal ideal, an ideal that Strauss would show suspicion for.
Strauss’s unique perspective of liberalism is due in part to his experience in the
Germany. The Weimer Republic would draft its constitution after World War I and thus
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began its liberal experiment. However, Germany had no history of democracy and this
would prove problematic for an effective republic. Democracy was predestined to fail as
most political groups were opposed to a parliamentary structure. Hitler would become
chancellor in 1933 and brought Germany to Nazi rule a year later.87
Though there are several reasons as to why Germany’s republic failed, Strauss
claims that it’s simply the nature of liberalism to “plant the seeds for its own destruction”.
The rise of Hitler and the horrors of Nazi Germany both illustrate, for Strauss, the
inevitable tyranny that awaits liberalism.88
Strauss’s critique of liberalism is understood through the crisis of modernity,
more specifically he feared modern relativism would surface through America’s liberal
traditions. Thomas Pangle wrote, referring to American culture, that “Ours is the culture
of “humanism” and “humanity’s enlightenment”, “to and through reason and
rationalism.”89 Reason and rationalism would, however, cultivate for Strauss a deadly
tolerance.
“But there is a tension between the respect for diversity or individuality and the
recognition of natural right. When liberals became impatient of the absolute
limits to diversity or individuality that are imposed even by the most liberal
version of natural right, they had to make a choice between natural right and the
uninhibited cultivation of individuality. They chose the latter. Once this step was
taken, tolerance appeared as one value or ideal among many, and not intrinsically
superior to its opposite. In other words intolerance appeared as a value equal in
dignity to tolerance.”90
Our inability to discern any natural right has led to the acceptance of all notions of natural
right, leading furthermore to nihilism and eventually to tolerate the intolerant.

For

Strauss this would lead to humankind’s inability to live as “responsible beings” and
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ultimately the destruction of history and our moral fabric. His prescription would be to
“silence the easily silenced voice of reason” lest we fell to “radical obscurantism”.91

Platonic Elitism and Deception through Culture
Strauss recognized the conventional nature of morality and meaning and understood
those conventions as products of power. Silencing the voice of reason meant maintaining
power in society.

Unlike the Enlightenment, which was advocated for egalitarian

designs, the ancients accepted inequality and subordination as natural. Accordingly, the
best form of government should be one exemplary of nature, where power is the
determining force.

Strauss would find such a society in Plato’s Republic, socially

designed to maintain a natural hierarchy. In that were the tools necessary for silencing
reason – myths handed down from the nobles, providing for the demos meaning and
purpose for their stratification, ultimately maintaining hierarchical integrity.

Plato

illustrates for us this noble lie:
Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed
you differently.

Some of you have the power of command, and in the

composition of these he has mingled gold. Wherefore also they have the greatest
honor; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others against who are to be
husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron.92
Strauss believed, like Plato, that “the good city is not possible than without a fundamental
falsehood; it cannot exist in the element of truth, of nature.”93 For Strauss deception was
an integral and necessary component of the healthy society. He elaborated on two
dimensions of Plato’s noble lie. The first is designed to bind the citizens together for
reasons of social cohesion. It would foster a national fraternity among the citizens
through myths of the nation. According to Strauss, “The fraternity of all human beings is
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to be replaced by the fraternity of all fellow citizens.”94 The second was to qualify the
inequality of fellow citizens through the myth of religion. Again, he writes: “While the
fraternity is traced to the earth, the inequality is traced to the god.”95 Religion would
provide justification for the natural hierarchy that takes place in humankind.

The

justification for hierarchy plays a practical role, not just as part of the myth but in the
very dissemination of myths. Lies are “useful only as a medicine to men” and “the use of
such medicines should be restricted to physicians”, those physicians being the elite.96
However, it is important to note the nature of Strauss’s elite, that being the distinction
between philosophers and non-philosophers. According to Zuckert and Zuckert, “what
distinguishes Strauss’s elite is not wealth, status, political, military, or economic power,
but recognition of ‘the truth’”.97

It was, for Straus, the manipulative role of the

philosopher kings to deceive the masses to assure a healthy society:
Again, truth should be highly valued; If, as we were saying; private individuals
have no business with them… Then if anyone at all is to have the privilege of
lying, the rulers of the state should be the persons.
As this passage suggests, only the elite is morally equipped to design and deceive the
nation. The use of nationalism and religion ensure social cohesion by creating culture.
Culture provides society with purpose and moral identity. It is these two dimensions of
the noble lie that maintain the health of the society and safeguard it from the dangers of
relativism.

Strauss on Schmitt: The Concept of the Political
Carl Schmitt’s essay, Concept of the Political offered a new domain of interest, that being
the political, which would provide the state with its own domain of predominance. This
concept of the political is understood through a distinction, and this distinction in which
94

Ibid 102.
Ibid 102.
96
Plato, Republic (New York: Barnes and Nobles Classics, 2004) 78.
97
Catherine and Michael Zuckert, The Truth About Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) 7.
95

36

“political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friends and enemy.”98 He
elaborates on the nature of the other:
The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not
appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage
with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger;
and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially
something different and alien, so that in a extreme case conflicts with him are
possible.99
For Schmitt the unity and identity of a group or the state is possible only in the
juxtaposition to the “other”.

This ‘othering’ makes war between groups very real,

however, at the same time, provides those groups with an identity formation process; thus
it is our struggle against each other that is the “pervasive and determining forces of
human existence”.100
Strauss would find this Hobbesian existentialism attractive because it was
affirming of the political and critical of liberalism. He writes:
It thus becomes clear why Schmitt rejects the ideal of pacifism (more
fundamentally: of civilization), why he affirms the political: he affirms the
political because he sees in the threatened status of the political a threat to the
seriousness of life.101
For Schmitt, the political was a necessary condition, one of threat and struggle, so that we
may place value on our lives and take responsibility for it. In an age of modernity
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however, liberalism and its promotion of ethical universalism would depoliticize the
world, thus trivializing and destroying the meaning of our existence.102
Strauss would agree with Schmitt that liberalism has failed but he would disagree
with Schmitt’s critique of liberalism. For Strauss, Schmitt “remained within the orbit of
modernity” by employing a main architect of liberalism, Hobbes, to explain the
friend/enemy distinction as intrinsic to the political.103 Thus Schmitt’s affirmation of the
political never materialized as a negation of liberalism, and, furthermore, such negation
was never really necessary to begin with. Strauss argues:
We said that Schmitt undertakes the critique of liberalism in a liberal world; and
we meant thereby that his critique of liberalism occurs in the horizon of
liberalism; his unliberal tendency is restrained by the still unvanquished
“systematics of liberal thought.” The critique introduced by Schmitt against
liberalism can therefore be completed only if one succeeds in gaining a horizon
beyond liberalism.104
Moving beyond the horizon of liberalism, beyond Hobbes, would challenge the idea of
the friend/enemy distinction as intrinsic to the political. Such an understanding could be
found in the ancients, where the distinction between friends and enemies is only a
derivative of the political. Like Schmitt’s conception of the political, the ancients too
recognized the tendency for man to form into groups. However, such groupings would
not rise out of enmity for another but instead were born out of man’s desire to “perfect
human nature as social and rational.”105 Each society, again, traced to the earth for
territorial boundaries, would also be traced to the God for moral boundaries. These moral
boundaries, what was moral permissible and not, binds society together and provides
meaning and purpose, making each group morally particularistic.
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Strauss sought for a higher, not a lower, understanding of the significance and
priority of the political. Strauss came to understand the political in relation to the
highest in humanity, and that led him to emphasize the dignity, not the
viciousness, of potential life.106
For Strauss the concept of the political is not defined by friends and enemies but rather a
desire to reach perfection through the practice of moral behavior.

Friend/enemy

distinctions are only derivatives of each groups’ moral particularism.
However, Strauss is quick to remind us that though humankind’s intentions are
virtuous, the friend/enemy distinction that derives from it remains real and grim and
reminds us as to why it, at times, seems appropriate for Schmitt to explain it through
Hobbes. Strauss writes:
In other words, it became clearer that it had been for some time that no bloody or
unbloody change of society can eradicate the evil in man: as long as there will be
men, there will be malice, envy and hatred.107
The consequences of this reveal themselves as ironic; it is our desire to reach perfection
through moral practice that paints the world as a constant struggle between good and evil
leaving humankind to conceive the world normatively in terms of ‘us and them’, and the
prophecy fulfills itself.
Strauss, like Schmitt, finds that it is important for the world to remain political.
He claims that “there cannot be a universal state, unitary or federative”.108 However,
unlike Schmitt, Strauss does not think it is necessary because it negates liberalism, but
rather it is a result of our highest moral aspirations which are necessary for making
humankind responsible members of society. A universal state can only signal an erosion
of our ‘life-giving’ myths and the disintegration of society.

Strauss argues this point

when talking about the West’s “experience of Communism” and the lessons learned:
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Apart from the fact that there does not exist now a universal federation of nations
but only of those nations which are called peace-loving, the federation that exists
masks the fundamental cleavage. If that federation is taken to seriously, as a
milestone on man’s onward march toward the perfect and hence universal society,
one is bound to take great risks supported by nothing but an inherited and perhaps
antiquated hope, and thus to endanger the very progress one endeavors to bring
about…Even if one would still contend that the Western purpose is as universal as
the Communist, one must rest satisfied for the foreseeable future with a practical
particularism.109
Furthermore Straus agrees with Schmitt that the threatened status of the political
threatens the seriousness of life. However, Strauss goes further than Schmitt and traces
the seriousness of life not to the political but what, as the classics understood, creates the
political, that being our desire to reach perfection through moral practice.

Strauss

continues:
The situation resembles the one which existed during the centuries in which
Cristianity and Islam each raised its universal claim but had to be satisfied with
uneasily coexisting with its antagonist. All this amounts to saying that for the
foreseeable future, political society remains what it always has been: a partial or
particular society who most urgent and primary task is its self-preservation and
whose highest task is its self-improvement.110
Ultimately for Strauss, it is our sense of self, our character and virtue, which is defined
through moral practice and self-improvement, that separates life-as-serious from life-asmere-entertainment.

This arranges humankind into conflicting groups, because, in

Schmitt’s words, “the political world is a pluriverse, not a universe”111 where war is not
born out of blind enmity but out of moral necessity and though this conflict is
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unfortunate, Strauss considers this better than the depolitical alternative that dehumanizes
and trivializes our existence.

Conclusion
To summarize, Strauss’s postmodernism can be understood through his arguments
against the rationalism and egalitarianism that emerge under liberalism. For Strauss,
social order depends on the cultivation of life-giving myths; more specifically societies
need to be founded on strong religious and nationalistic convictions that constitute a
culture. Rationalism and science, however, expose these religious and national beliefs as
having no inherent truth or natural right. Modernity would then witness this nihilism
converge with the liberal movement’s celebration of the individual. Strauss feared that
liberal societies would destroy culture and collapse without a sense of natural right to
constrain the individual’s self-interests.
Understanding Strauss’s anxieties about modernity’s rationalism and liberalism
clarifies as to what his ‘return to the ancients’ is and why he prescribes it. It is a
contraposition to modernity by prescribing what is antithetical to both rationalism and
liberalism. Strauss argues that it is the role of the elites to propagate myths that provide
the masses with cultural truth and natural right. He perceives a destructive self-interested
relativism growing from liberalism’s egalitarian designs and the advancement of
knowledge.

He combats this by supplanting liberalism with cultural elites and

knowledge with myths of nation and origin. For Strauss, elites and myths co-act to form
the concept of Platonic elitism, where the role of the elite is to transmit such myths in
order to protect society from the dangers of relativism. Simply put, Platonic elites
safeguard society from moral relativism by the use of their power to assert religious and
nationalistic values. These values constitute a culture that informs what the regime, the
nature of the political society, would look like. It is the character of the regime that
frames foreign policy, an expression of its own particular character, which inevitably
becomes contentious among differing regimes. For Strauss, regime is at the core of the
‘political’ – friend/enemy distinctions are only a symptom of the ‘political’.
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It is these two major points of Strauss’s fear of relativism, 1) his suspicion of
liberalism and 2) Platonic elitism, that neoconservatives have internalized as there own.
The next chapter will demonstrate how these two points have been translated and
employed by the neoconservative movement.
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Chapter 3: Linking Neoconservatism to Straussianism

Introduction
Many neoconservatives were quite open about their admiration for Strauss.

Irving

Kristol, often called the “godfather” of neoconservatism, describes reading Strauss as
“the kind of intellectual shock that is a once-in-a-lifetime experience. He turned one’s
intellectual universe upside down.”112 Allan Bloom claimed that meeting Strauss had
been the “decisive moment” of his life.113 Strauss’s thought would have such an impact
on his students and readers that it would form a close circle of scholars and intellectuals
faithful to the Straussian discipline. Werner J. Dannhauser illustrates this best by saying,
“Leo Strauss was like a sun around which we thought ourselves privileged to orbit”.114
Many have referred to such students of Strauss as ‘disciples’. Whether the term has risen
out of mockery or endearment, several Straussians have accepted the title.
What truly links neoconservatism to Straussianism is the fear of relativism that is
suspicious of liberalism and works to establish cultural elites. The neoconservative
movement, which grew around intellectuals such as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, believed they were witnessing the disintegration of
Western society through the culture wars of the 1960s and 1970s and the Cold War.
They feared that the anti-Americanism during the culture wars and détente with the
Soviets were signs of growing relativism in our modern society. Norman Podhoretz
writes:
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“Finally, there was the realm of culture. If anti-Communism was the ruling
passion of the neoconservatives in foreign affairs, opposition to the counterculture
of the 1960s was their ruling passion at home. Indeed, I suspect that revulsion
against the counterculture accounted for more converts to neoconservatism than
any other single factor.”115
This chapter, then, will evidence the link between Straussianiam and neoconservatism by
demonstrating the fear of relativism in two historical periods: 1) the neoconservative
response to the culture wars of the mid 1960s and early 1970s and 2) their rise of political
power during the Cold War.

The Culture Wars
“Leo Strauss became a significant factor in the culture war, and neoconservatives
brought Strauss in.”116 – Irving Kristol
Neoconservative fear of relativism will be demonstrated through their hostility towards
liberalism and desire to establish cultural elites. The hostility towards liberalism will be
evidenced through their opposition towards the counterculture’s tolerance, individualism
and egalitarianism.

Such liberalism would invite a moral relativism through the

emergence of multiculturalism and general anti-Americanism that would follow.
Platonic elitism, again meaning the employment of power or status to affirm traditional
and cultural values, will be evidenced through the assertion of religious truths and the
championing of American nationalism.
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Hostility towards Liberalism – Opposition to Counterculture
America in the 1960s witnessed new and progressive political and cultural trends. This
era saw the emergence of the New Left and Johnson’s “Great Society”. Issues of equality
became more urgent during this time as seen with the civil rights movement, the feminist
movement, and the war on poverty. Under the civil rights movement new reforms passed
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Right Act of 1965. Johnson’s War on
Poverty passed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 which was followed by a number
of programs aimed at eliminating poverty. The Higher Education Act of 1965 granted
more money to universities and made loans more accessible to students.
But reform did not take place without struggle. Race riots broke out in Watts,
Detroit, and Cleveland in the late 1960s.117 The Stonewall riots marked the beginning of
violent struggles for the LGBT. Possibly the largest radical movement was the student
rebellions voicing a variety of issues ranging from curricular reforms to protesting against
the Vietnam War. Students, for instance, engaged in campus riots, sit-in, and marches.
The death of four students by the National Guard at Kent State marked the violent
consequences of crackdowns.118
In addition, there was religious and sexual experimentalism in which younger generations
pushed the boundaries of decency through homosexuality, libertinism, intoxication,
excess. Suicide, out-of-wedlock-birth, divorce, drug use and other signs of crisis rose.
For the neoconservatives, these times highlighted a time of moral decadence and crisis
and marked a new culture emerging in opposition to the current one, a counterculture.
Peter Steinfels accurately describes the neoconservatives’ reactions to this period.
“The current crisis is primarily a cultural crisis, a matter of values, morals, and
manners.

Though this crisis has causes and consequences on the level of

socioeconomic structures, neoconservatism, unlike the Left, tends to think these
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have performed well. The problem is that our convictions have gone slack, our
morals loose, our manners corrupt.”119
Here is where we understand the neoconservative critique of liberalism, through their
concerns of the counterculture. The New Left of the 1960s spawned a counterculture that
neoconservatives viewed as “cynical, nihilistic, and exploitative.”120 As one of the main
actors in this countercultural movement, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
popularized political radicalism and extremism through various student rebellions.121
However, while the SDS saw their struggle on campuses as one that might improve
society, neoconservatives saw it as one that would destroy society. Neoconservatives,
such as Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol and Allan Bloom were some of the
most vocal against the student rebellions. Bloom, referring to the universities in the
1960s, has said “I know of nothing positive coming from that period; it was an
unmitigated disaster for them”.122 Kristol wrote in his memoirs:
“The major event of that period was the student rebellion and the rise of the
counterculture, with its messianic expectations and its apocalyptic fears…
Suddenly we discovered that we had been cultural conservatives all along.”123
Glazer wrote in “The Campus Crucible”:
“…My first reaction to the student disruption – and it is not only an emotional one
– is to consider how the disrupters can be isolated and weakened, how their
influence, which is now enormous among students, can be reduced, how
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dissension among them can be encouraged, and how they can be finally removed
from a community they wish to destroy.”124
Podhoretz wrote in “Neoconservatism: A Eulogy”:
“Indeed, I suspect that revulsion against the counterculture accounted for more
converts to neoconservatism than any other single factor. This revulsion was not
only directed against the counterculture itself; it was also inspired by the abject
failure of the great institutions of liberal community to resist the
counterculture…In part the problem was simple moral cowardice, but in part it
was sheer inability of these institutions to defend themselves intellectually when
they came under attack.”125
Podhoretz illustrates here not only revulsion against the counterculture but liberalism
itself.

Here is where we can draw one of the links between Straussianism and

neoconservatism, not simply because of their mutual criticism of liberalism but because
the founders of neoconservatism had adopted Strauss’s logic that “liberalism leads to
relativism”. To critique this point requires understanding the neoconservative reaction to
the New Left’s egalitarian demands. Irving Kristol, considered to be the ‘godfather of
neoconservatism’ demonstrates this best in his work. He argues that demands for greater
equality are not rooted in inequality at all. In fact, Kristol claims that inequality is
healthy in society.

Much like Strauss who favored the ancient’s model of social

hierarchy exemplary of the inequalities found in nature, so too does Kristol advocate for
Aristotle’s legitimate society, “in which inequalities – of property, or station, or power –
are generally perceived by the citizenry as necessary for the common good”.126 He goes
on to say that dissatisfaction with this definition of a legitimate society arises from
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liberalism’s conception of it. However, he claims that liberalism itself is inequitable
because it is “based on a deficient conception of the common good”.127 It cannot provide
the equality that it promises and so its critics become more enraged but “there are no
reforms that are going to placate the egalitarian impulse”.128
For Kristol, much like Strauss, crisis in society is not rooted in inequality but
rather how equality leads to nihilism. His crisis of liberalism, then, isn’t understood to
end with egalitarianism but rather how egalitarian struggles leave societies in a “religious
vacuum – a lack of meaning in their own lives, and the absence of a sense of larger
purpose in their society – that terrifies them and provokes them to ‘alienation’ and
unappeasable indignation”.129 According to Kristol:
“They have obtained enough of the comforts of bourgeois civilization, and have a
secure enough grip upon them, to permit themselves the luxury of reflecting
uneasily upon the inadequacies of their civilization. They then discover that a life
that is without a sense of purpose creates an acute experience of anxiety, which in
turn transforms the universe into a hostile, repressive place. The spiritual history
of mankind is full of such existential moments, which are the seedbeds of Gnostic
and millenarian movements – movements that aim at both spiritual and material
reformations. Radical egalitarianism is, in our day, exactly such a movement.”130
Kristol claims that a secular sense of success has replaced the religious sense of virtue.
Understanding Kristol’s argument further links neoconservatism to Strauss’s suspicions
of liberalism. Kristol’s argument reflects Strauss’s concerns of constructing virtue in
terms of the civic. This was the virtue of Machiavelli, the original modern thinker who
glorified men of action, launching a direction of human history towards the
enlightenment and Adam Smith’s market economy. This was important for Kristol
because for him Smith was the first in history to establish a “moral legitimacy of a market
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economy based on self-interested activity”.131 However, this would lead to cultural
attitudes being subject to self-interest and matters of taste which would leave the heirs of
Adam Smith “powerless against capitalism’s cultural critics” and void of a moral
compass.132 Kristol Writes:
“Bourgeois Society is [Smiths] legacy, for good and ill. For good, in that it has
produced through the market economy a world prosperous beyond all previous
imaginings – even social imaginings. For ill, in that this world, with every
passing decade, has become ever more spiritually impoverished. That war on
poverty is the great unfinished task before us.”133
Our capitalist society, though originally successful in because of its incorporation of
moral tradition, entered into a “crisis of faith” because it “erred in cutting this moral
tradition away from the religious context that nourished it”.134 Instead, for Kristol,
American capitalism had popularized consumerism and materialism, pandering to our
physical wants rather than our spiritual needs. Launching our history in such a direction
would culminate with Nietzsche’s nihilism, an era that provided no “transcendent
meaning” and therefore no metaphysical justification for inequality in bourgeois
society135; rather inequality was a function of the market economy’s neutrality. Thus
history culminates, for Kristol with his ‘crisis of faith’ or rather his ‘crisis of bourgeois
society’, and to further draw the link, runs parallel with Strauss’s crisis of modernity.
According to Kristol:
“Nietzsche and his disciple, the Nazi sympathizer Martin Heidegger, are almost
unanimously regarded as the two philosophical giants of the modern era. It is
important to understand that their teachings are subversive not only of bourgeois
society and Judeo-Christian tradition but also of secular humanism, secular
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rationalism, bourgeois morality – and, in the end, of Western civilization
itself.”136
According to Kristol religion and cultural orthodoxy are imperative for societal stability.
However, with the countercultural attack on orthodoxy, Kristol and the neoconservatives
believed they were witnessing the breakdown of Western civilization itself. For them the
culture wars were evidence that liberal society fostered a deadly relativism that led to
nihilism. The New Left’s egalitarian struggles championed the individual’s right to equal
access and recognition but at the expense of moral society. The stability of a society is
dependant on a shared sense of religious origin and a unique national destiny, or indeed a
strong sense of collectivism. However, American liberalism cultivated an atomistic
individualism that ran counter to the neoconservative conception of stability through
collectivism. Individual preferences were now as legitimate as the next and should be
tolerated as such. What would follow were the temptations of Dionysus and our fall into
moral decadence.
Crisis became more evident when individual’s particular moral beliefs challenged
those shared forms of identity meant to hold society together, more specifically when
Americans protested against the Vietnam War.

In a sense the counterculture was

“alienated from the modern traditions that created them.”137

America became

enlightened to the conventional nature of its myths especially the myth of the nation
which was evident in the protests against the Vietnam War.
“The central aspect of the antiwar movement was less its rejection of Vietnam
War than its rejection of the United States. The argument was less that the war
was unwise or unnecessary than that the United States was immoral – a ‘sick
society’ guilty of racism, materialism, imperialism, and murder of the Third
World people of Vietnam”138
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In general, for neoconservatives counterculture was inevitable because its cause were
internal, originating from America’s latest secular and humanist inclinations.139
American modern humanism provided counterculture with a new found agency to
improve our political and social conditions, to construct virtue in terms of the civic.
Neoconservatives were apprehensive; the liberalism of this period for them, all too
suggestive of the modern problem – that our conquest over nature would undoubtedly
direct us towards relativism.

Platonic Elitism – Affirmation of Religious/Cultural Orthodoxy
The origins of neoconservatism are rooted in their perceived development of crisis during
the 1960s and 1970s, but this is not where it ends. Neoconservatism was not interested in
being a mere witness to history but wanted to change it. It was, after all, a movement
itself.

Neoconservatism emerged as a force to combat the effects of counter-

counterculture. Podhoretz has stated:
“Neoconservatism came into the world to combat the dangerous lies that were
being spread by the radicalism of the sixties and that were being accepted as truth
by the established liberal institutions of the day.”140
The neoconservative movement worked to combat the crisis in American culture and
politics – but how?

The answer lies in the nature of their crisis, the egalitarian

imperatives and hostilities towards religious and nationalistic orthodoxy.

This is

illustrative, again, of Strauss’s influence on their determination to revive a shared sense
of origin and destiny through traditional religious and American values; the use Plato’s
noble lie. Kristol has stated:
“Countercultures are dangerous phenomena even as they are inevitable. Their
destructive power always far exceeds their constructive power. The delicate task
139
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that faces our civilization today is not to reform the secular rationalist orthodoxy,
which has passed beyond the point of redemption. Rather, it is to breathe new life
into the older, now largely comatose, religious orthodoxy – while resisting the
counterculture as best we can, adapting to it and reshaping it where we can not
simply resist.”141
This is where we can evidence the Platonic elitism in neoconservatism; to “breath new
life” into the religious orthodoxy, to revive religious traditional myths. Michael Lind
writes:
“For the neoconservatives, religion is an instrument of promoting morality.
Religion becomes what Plato called a “noble lie.” It is a myth which is told to the
majority of the society by the philosophical elite in order to ensure social
order.”142
However, this only provides us with the neoconservative’s mission, it does not answer
what tools they would use or how they would “breath life” into the older orthodoxy.
They would do so through various publication especially The Public Interest.
In 1965, Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan
started The Public Interest with the intention of providing program and policy analysis.
They originally voted for Lyndon Johnson and expected the Great Society to eliminate
poverty and fix education. However, their disenchantment with the culture wars and the
general direction of the country caused them to reflect on their previous political
priorities, their original views of human nature and thus their mission at the Public
Interest. As examined above the problem wasn’t policy, it was culture. David Brooks, in
his article about the Public Interest, wrote:
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“It occurred to several of the editors that they had accepted a simplistic view of
human nature. They had thought of humans as economically motivated rational
actors, who would response in relatively straightforward ways to incentives. In
fact, what really matters, they decided, is culture, ethos, character and morality.
By the 1970s, the Public Interest was publishing as many essays on these things
as on quantitative social science”.143
The Public Interest was concerned not only with political and economic matters but
became committed to that which it thought was at the heart of politics and economics; the
publication considered culture, our shared sense of morality and meaning, to be the most
consequential and urgent matter. Thus the Public Interest was a return to myth.
“The Public Interest examined violence on campuses, the increasing numbers of
unwed mothers, failures in education and the persistence of poverty, and saw not
just economic or political phenomena, but cultural phenomena reflecting deeply
ingrained beliefs or behaviors.”144
Addressing social problems then was no longer limited to contributing political and
economic policies but working to reinvigorate religious orthodoxy in society. Brooks
recalled what James Q. Wilson, contributor to the Public Interest, wrote about the
publication in 1985:
“At root in almost every area of public concern, we are seeking to induce persons
to act virtuously, whether as schoolchildren, applicants for public assistants,
would-be lawbreakers, or voters and public officials.”145
The Public Interest evidences the neoconservatives’ Platonic elitism in the 1960s and
1970s by illustrating how the contributing social scientists constituted a Straussian elite
whose agenda was to revive a traditional sense of virtue and religious orthodoxy. In
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general, it was through these socials scientists’ writings that neoconservatives were
transmitting noble myths to society.

The Cold War
“Yet what Straussians and neoconservatives were actually committed to doing
during the Reagan administration was defending and reinvigorating democracy:
first by altering the unsatisfactory status quo of détente with hostile ideologies”146
This section will demonstrate the neoconservative fears of relativism through their role in
politics during the Cold War. Straussian anxieties towards liberalism will be evidenced
through the neoconservative fear of negating the political. Liberalism’s tendency towards
moral relativism would potentially negate the political, and thus blur distinctions between
our particular metaphysical and existential identities.

Such an erosion of particularism

would usher in a new era of liberal cosmopolitanism, weltanschauung, and thus an
erosion of existential and moral identity. Platonic elitism will be evidenced through
neoconservatism’s affirmation of the political.

I argue that their affirmation of the

political would ultimately bring Strauss’s concept of the ‘regime’ back into foreign
affairs as the core of the political rather than friend/enemy distinctions.

Hostilities towards Liberalism – Aversion to Détente
As stated previously by Podhoretz, anti-communism was the “ruling passion” for
neoconservatives in foreign affairs. For them, the Soviet Union was the most urgent
threat to the American way of life and one that could not be contained. They viewed
Kissingerian détente as weakness; “it legitimized Soviet communism and allowed the
Soviet Union to keep itself on a military par with the vastly more productive United
States.”147. Neoconservatives did not see détente as peace between nations but rather as
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uneasy coexistence between antagonists. For them conflict was inevitable and even
necessary. According to social scientist Gary Dorrien:
“To portray the Soviet Union as a competing superpower was to undermine
America’s will and capacity to fight communism. It was the tragic legacy of the
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations to have undermined America’s life or
death mission”.148
Neoconservatives described the Cold War in terms of ‘us and them’ narratives. For them
the Soviet Union was an existential ‘other’ understood as our direct opposite and
therefore each mutually suspicious of the others intentions. Kirkpatrick wrote:
“We did not doubt that American Society could be improved but we believed it
first had to be preserved.

We believed moreover that there were important

differences between democracy and dictatorship, and that the greatest differences
of all were between democracy and totalitarianism. We could not therefore be
indifferent to the spread of Soviet power or to the human consequences of seeing
new tyrannies established.”149
Here is where the case of the Cold War provides another link between Straussianism and
neoconservatism.

Both “understood politics as a conflict between mutually hostile

groups”150, but more importantly, both understood the reasons as to what makes groups
different and thus hostile, each groups unique character. As Kirkpatrick points out, the
threat posed by the Soviet Union did not arise from its mere ‘otherness’ but rather that
which made it the other and essentially different from America, that being its ideological
character, a totalitarian state. Kirkpatrick’s concern for this differing character correlates
with Strauss’s warning that liberalism “assumed that social progress could be achieved
through external or institutional means rather than through ‘the formation of
148
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character’”.151

Neoconservatives thus elevated the Cold War outside of balance-of-

power-politics into an ideological war, where détente would surely fail in securing
America’s character and sense of ‘rightness’.

By forfeiting realpolitik strategies to

engage the Soviets ideologically, neoconservatives would no longer depict the Cold War
as between the U.S. and the Soviet Union but rather as a fight between democracy and
totalitarianism, a cause “greater than ourselves”. Brigitte and Peter Berger wrote:
“We believe that the most important political and moral challenge of our time is
the struggle for the survival of freedom. In the international context this struggle
has its focus in the resistance to the spread of Soviet-style totalitarianism.”152
Brigitte and Peter Berger illustrate the urgent threat that totalitarianism posed to the
survival of democracy leaving the only option to aggressively engage the Soviets. Like
Straus, the neoconservatives portrayed conflict between states as a result of conflict
between their characters, and the political world was not simply bellicose but rather
morally preoccupied where war was a struggle for a sense of rightness. A depolitical
world meant that we were losing our convictions.
It is for this reason that neoconservatives were concerned with détente, because it
was a negation of the political. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, cofounder of The Public
Interest with Kristol, Bell, and Glazer, illustrates the neoconservative concerns with the
Soviet Union and détente the best. Vehemently against the idea of anything positive in a
totalitarian society he said “I will not split the difference between a totalitarian society
and an open one, or suggest that there is good to be said on both sides”.153 For him it was
this absolute and decisive attitude that was needed in foreign affairs that American
diplomacy lacked. He told the New York Times: “I don’t think we’re very good at
ideological argument.”154 In 1978 after serving as U.S. ambassador to the UN, Moynihan
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argued this point again saying that we could no longer act wholeheartedly upon our
convictions.

He would refer to this as a “failure of nerve”.

John Ehrman recalls

Moynihan diagnosing this “failure of nerve”:
“Yet more than ever, he argued, the West was failing to stand up to the Soviets;
the failure of nerve, he told Ben Wattenberg in April 1978 was affecting foreign
policy ‘more so now than a few years ago when I originally sensed it.’ Moynihan
continued to be especially irritated with those ‘former cold warriors…who…have
decided that the country really is hopeless, that it has no capacity to resist the
advance of totalitarianism, and that the best thing to do is accommodate and
appease.’”155
The reason for this failure of nerve, again as neoconservatism picks up its queues from
Strauss, is traced back to liberalism. According to Moynihan, liberal moral ambiguity
had sapped America’s will to fight for that which was at one time virtuous. Edwin
Warner of Time Magazine wrote:
“For all his scorn, Moynihan does not want to quit the U.N. or ignore it; on the
contrary, he insists on taking it more seriously as a forum to advance U.S. values
and interests. He faults the American liberal intelligentsia for its reluctance to do
ideological battle, for what he calls its failure of nerve.”156
Like Strauss’s concerns that liberalism leads to relativism which then leads to nihilism, so
too did Moynihan fear that our liberal intelligentsia lacked the moral conviction and
courage to defend and advance America’s interests. The effects of such diplomatic
passivity would be disastrous. An excerpt from Time Magazine in 1976 read:
“As a result, Moynihan says, there are today no more than two dozen genuine
democracies remaining in the world, and indeed he has suggested gloomily that
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liberal democracy in the 20th century may be the kind of vanishing phenomenon
that monarchy was in the 19th. As a consequence, the U.N. has become ‘a locus
of general assault’ by the majority of socialist nations ‘on the principles of liberal
democracy.’”157
He feared that the world would perceive America’s diplomatic passivity and lack of
moral courage, especially after the attacks on American values by counterculture coupled
with its defeat in Vietnam, as losing an ideological war to totalitarianism and Soviet
expansionism.
“The United States was the only power with the moral and military resources to
guarantee freedom and security in the world. If the United States let the Vietnam
experience sap her self-confidence and damage her will, the fragile forces of
freedom would be vanquished.”158
Neoconservatives were concerned that America was losing its moral convictions in a
modern world where morality is relative, and that it was noticeable in foreign affairs.
The next section will discuss the neoconservative solution. To combat relativism and
passivity, they would affirm the political which would ultimately reaffirm our morality.
By standing up for America’s interests and moral leadership in foreign affairs,
neoconservatives were affirming democracy’s moral necessity in the world, thus
affirming America’s moral rightness and national destiny.

Platonic Elitism – Affirmation of the Political
The Cold War would witness a major rise of the neoconservatism, especially under the
Reagan administration.

Jean Kirkpatrick was a member of Reagan’s cabinet and

ambassador to the UN.

Richard Pearle became Assistant secretary of defense for

international security policy.

Michael Novak became U.S. Ambassador of the UN
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Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Elliot Abrams served as an Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights. Paul Wolfowitz became assistant secretary of state for East
Asian and Pacific affairs.

Norman Podhoretz served as an adviser to the U.S.

Information Agency. Robert Kagan was a speechwriter for Secretary of State George P.
Shultz.
Reagan’s White House served them well because they were attracted to his
staunch anti-Sovietism.

His aggressive foreign policy resembled that of the

neoconservative’s failed anti-communist presidential nominee Henry “Scoop” Jackson in
1972. Only this time they were on the winning side and, with Reagan, were now in a
position to advance anti-Sovietism to the top of America’s priorities. According to
historian, John Ehrman:
“In Reagan, the neoconservative believed that they had a president who shared
their view of the world and, especially, of the overriding importance of resisting
Soviet Expansionism and Third World leftism…The neoconservatives, especially
Norman Podhoretz, hoped to consolidate this success and build popular support
for a foreign policy that would go beyond mere containment.

Echoing the

conservatives of the early 1950s, they called for actively working for the rollback
and eventual defeat of Communism.”159
Reagan’s foreign policy adopted the neoconservative’s hard-lined and ideological stance
towards the Soviet Union and challenged its place in the world unlike his realist
predecessors who desired balance of power and mutual security.160 Dorrien wrote: What
was needed was a courageously ideological leader who recognized the implacable
hostility of the Soviet state and faced up to the necessity of making life intolerable for
it.”161 Reagan was that ideological leader. In 1983 before the National Association of
Evangelicals he dubbed the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’:
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“So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a
position of military and moral inferiority…So, in your discussions of the nuclear
freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride - the temptation of
blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to
ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to
simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself
from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.”162
Reagan was that “ideological leader” which would provide neoconservatives the
opportunity to affirm their moralism through foreign policy.

Both Abrams and

Wolfowitz were hostile towards the popular ‘liberal internationalism’ and pushed for “a
foreign policy that made an ethical distinction between the USSR and the United
States.”163 Abrams wrote of the importance of an “ideological response” as well as a
military response:
“We will never maintain wide public support for our foreign policy unless we can
relate it to American ideals and to the defense of freedom…Our ability to resist
the Soviets around the world depends in part on our ability to draw this distinction
and to persuade others of it…Our struggle is for political liberty.”
Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote “Dictatorships and Double Standards”, an essay that some
consider to be the “greatest neoconservative anticommunist essay”.164 Her essay was
very critical of Carter’s foreign policy and argued that by hastening liberalization in
autocratic countries such as Iran and Nicaragua, Carter inadvertently lost those countries
to groups even more anti-American before.165 However, she was not attacking Carter’s
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idealism for she too “believed that a conviction in the righteousness of U.S. purpose and
power was indispensable in the execution of effective diplomacy”.166 What she was
arguing against was Carter’s application of that idealism.

Autocratic regimes are

protective of their own power and resources but leave most of life untouched and perhaps
even preserve institutions that democracy can be built upon. “Precisely the opposite is
true of revolutionary Communist regimes” which “claim jurisdiction over the whole life
of the society” thus infiltrating and destroying those institutions necessary for
democratization. She accused the Carter administration of a double standard by not
applying the same rhetoric of democratization to communist countries.167 Kirkpatrick
advised Reagan both morally and intellectually and “began the synthesis of the realist and
idealist traditions of American diplomacy into a powerful synthesis.”168
Despite their hopes with Reagan, many neoconservatives, especially Podhoretz,
became disenchanted with him, and argued that his ideological and militant rhetoric was
producing nothing more than a “throwback to the Basic principles of Détente of 1972”.169
Despite their disenchantment, the end of the Cold War would lead many
neoconservatives, especially William Kristol, son of Irving Kristol, to claim that it was
not containment that defeated totalitarianism, but rather “unapologetic, aggressive
militarism”.170
Neoconservatives solidified their role in politics during the first term of the
Reagan administration when they were able to assert their affirmation of the political.
This is important because, as it is illustrated that the neoconservative philosophy is linked
back to Strauss, they have based their affirmation on the “belief that the internal character
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of regimes matters and that foreign policy must reflect the deepest values of liberal
democratic societies.”171 Fukuyama writes:
“The early neoconservative anti-Stalinists saw the Cold War as a struggle over
ideology and values, a fight that continued into the Reagan years over how to deal
with the Soviet Union. The Straussian current in neoconservatism also saw the
regime as a central organizing principle of politics.”172
Neoconservatives used their positions of power to affirm the political but for the reason
that the regime should govern foreign affairs.

This was “Strauss's restoration of a

political science that places the regime in the forefront of analysis.”173
However, with the end of the Cold War and with no ideological other, the regime
would no longer be the center of our political science. Fukuyama brings this problem to
light in his “End of History”. This is an important book as Nicholas Xenos points out
that Fukuyama’s understanding of the regime and readings of Strauss “reveals more
about Straussianism and its central place within neoconservatism than he realizes.”174
Fukuyama wrote in the beginning of America at the Crossroads that he was a “student of
Allan Bloom, himself a student of Leo Strauss and the author of The Closing of the
American Mind”.
“That lineage is important, because it links three books that are central to
understanding the place that Straussianism has assumed within neoconservatism:
Strauss’s Natural Right and History, Alan Bloom’s Closing of the American
Mind, and Fukuyama’s own bestseller, The End of History and the Last Man”175
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Fukuyama argued in The End of History and the Last Man that humankind’s ideological
evolution has reached its apex with the construction of liberal democracy. According to
him:
“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of
a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the
end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western
liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”176
Though this is not necessarily bad news for Fukuyama, his Straussian influences are
quick to remind us of the dangers of relativism inherent in liberalism.
“They [democratic societies] cultivate the culture of toleration, which becomes
the chief virtue in democratic societies. And if men are unable to affirm that any
particular way of life is superior to another, then they will fall back on the
affirmation of life itself, that is the body, its needs, its fears.”177
Fukuyama’s affirmation of ‘life itself’ is referencing Nietzsche’s “Last Man”, he who
“schooled by Hobbes and Locke, gave up prideful belief in his or her own superior worth
in favor of comfortable self-preservation.”178 He explains this through the notion of the
thymos, the prideful part of our “soul” that struggles for recognition by placing values
and meanings to life. It is a necessary part of who we are; it is the “driving force of
history”.179 However, the social contract demands equal recognition for all based on their
mere “person-ness”.

By universalizing recognition, liberalism has made one’s

recognition indistinguishable from another, thus devaluing it.

If history ends with

liberalism, then there is no more struggle, leaving the thymotic part of our soul
dissatisfied with life. Fukuyama writes:
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“The end of history would mean the end of wars and bloody revolutions.
Agreeing on ends, men would have no large causes for which to fight…Human
life, then, involves a curious paradox; it seems to require injustice, for the struggle
against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man.”180
Much like Schmitt’s concept of the political, where the affirmation of the political is the
affirmation of the moral181, Fukuyama argues that liberalism, as the end of history,
universalizes recognition, stripping man of his megalothymia and depoliticizing him into
the Last Man.
Fukuyama and other neoconservatives would then question whether the defeat of
the Soviets was actually a victory for America. The Cold War provided America with an
ideological other and now, as Kristol noted, “the enemy is us, not them.”182 They feared
that the triumph of liberalism over all others would usher in a new order of ethical
universalism, cultivating relativism and sending us into crisis. Allan Bloom wrote in
response to Fukuyama’s article:
“This fifty years of opposition to fascism and communism provided us with clear
moral and political goals, but they were negative. We took our orientation from
the evil we faced, and it brought out the best in us. The threat from outside
disciplined us inside while protecting us from too much depressing reflection on
ourselves. The global nature of the conflicts we were engaged in imposed an
unprecedented uniformity on the world. It has been liberalism--or else.”183
This lack of ideological struggle would follow the end of the Cold War in, what Charles
Krauthammer would call, the Clinton Doctrine of “morality and universality”.

His

humanitarian efforts at their worst, reflected “hypocrisy; at best, extreme naiveté.”184
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This coupled with the preoccupation for economic growth lacked, for the
neoconservatives, the moral clarity needed to guide America through the end of history.
Corey Robin says it best:
“For neoconservatives, who had thrilled to the crusade against communism, all
that was left of Ronald Reagan's legacy after the Cold War was a sunny
entrepreneurialism and market joie de vivre, which found a welcome home in Bill
Clinton's America. While neocons are not opposed to capitalism, they do not
believe it is the highest achievement of civilization…today's conservatives prize
mystery and vitality and are uncomfortable with rationalism and technology. Such
romantic sensibilities are uneasy about the market but friendly to politics,
particularly at moments when politics is consumed with questions of war.”185
America’s concerns needed to be refocused. New neoconservatives would emerge into
power as evidence by Kristol and Kagan calling for a “neo-Reaganite” agenda of
American ‘benevolence’ and hegemony.

The end of Bush senior’s administration,

witnessing the break up of the Soviet Union and the cease fire with Iraq, provided
Wolfowitz with the opportunity to write a new Defense Planning Guidance of 1992. This
‘Wolfowitz Doctrine’ recognized the U.S. as the victor of the Cold War and the sole
superpower; it argued in favor of military action, against multilateralism, and praised
American exceptionalism.186 Neoconservatives would work hard to replace the Clinton
Doctrine with the Wolfowoitz Doctrine. Most of them would focus their concerns on
Iraq. The most obvious example of this is the PNAC’s “Letter to President Clinton on
Iraq”. It urged for military action as “containment of Saddam Hussein has been steadily
eroding”. The Wolfowitz Doctrine is key, not only because it redirected our attention
away from economic prosperity to foreign policy dangers, but because it was also the
framework from which the Bush Doctrine would be designed.187
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Conclusion
This chapter attempted to link neoconservatism to Straussianism through the culture wars
and the Cold War. The culture wars link neoconservatism to Strauss’s conception of
culture.

Strauss believed societies need to be founded on strong religious and

nationalistic convictions that constitute a culture.

Neoconservatives saw those

convictions breaking down in the face of relativism which was all too suggestive of
Strauss’s crisis of modernity. They assumed the role of the educated elite which, through
their writing, they would reaffirm and transmit traditional values ushering in a new
confidence for American culture.
For Strauss, culture would inform the type of regime to rule. The regime could
only view foreign affairs, then, through the lens of its own virtues.

Strauss’s

understanding of this would then change what was at the core of the political from
Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction to the nature of the regime.

Neoconservatives

believed they were witnessing an erosion of the political because détente no longer
placed the regime as a determining force in foreign affairs. Neoconservatives, then,
diagnosed our indifference to regime as a result of the moral, cultural, and political
relativism breeding in America’s liberal intelligentsia. In the end, with their rise to power
in the Reagan White House, they would bring the regime back into politics by engaging
the Soviets ideological.
The next chapter will explain how neoconservatism has been epitomized in the
Bush Doctrine, especially in its fear of relativism and by extension the emphasis it places
on the regime.
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Chapter 4: The Bush Doctrine

Introduction
This chapter will assess of the basic themes of the Bush Doctrine and the themes make
this doctrine distinctively neoconservative.

Neoconservatism, as discussed in the

previous chapter, promoted a sense of moral absolutism in American culture and stressed
the character of the American regime as a guide for foreign policy principles. This
chapter will demonstrate how the Bush Doctrine became the defining context of
neoconservative politics by exposing its moral absolutism and the role it places on regime
in foreign affairs.
While neoconservatism remained dormant during the Clinton years, it would
reemerge under the Bush Doctrine. Many neoconservatives would enter the White House
under the George W. Bush administration. Douglas Feith served as the Under Secretary
of Defense. Zalmay Khalilzad served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq. Elliot Abrams served as Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director on the National Security Council for Near East and North African. Seth
Cropsey served as the director of the International Broadcasting Bureau. Paul Wolfowitz
served as deputy secretary of defense. Abram Shulsky served as the Senior Adviser to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Iranian Directorate and would direct the
Office of Special Plans. Richard Pearle served as Chairman of the Board for the Defense
Policy Board Advisory Committee.
Both neoconservatives and Straussians, whether inside the White House or the
media, would reorganize around a new existential threat. However, this next generation
of neoconservative were somewhat different then their Cold War predecessors;
neoconservatism became more volatile and more militant. Older neoconservatives, such
as Irving Kristol and Jeane Kirkpatrick, were reluctant to endorse the idea of an Iraq
invasion while the younger generation, led by William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Joshua
Muravchik, Charles Krauthammer and others, were first to support the idea of using
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American power to transform the world. Just like the older generation, they too were
‘culture warriors’ but the measures they took would be more extreme. For them, the
outlook of the West in a modern era was more urgent than ever. They would view the
Bush Doctrine as America’s salvation. This chapter will explain what makes the Bush
Doctrine so distinctively neoconservative but first will provide a critique of the Bush
Doctrine’s main themes.

The Pillars of the Bush Doctrine
George W. Bush would be elected in 2000, reveal his foreign policies at his
commencement speech at west point in 2002, and three months later, make public his
National Security Strategy.

The strategy would make use of the main points in

Wolfowitz’s 1992 plan, especially in terms of preemption, hegemony, and Wilsonian
idealism.188 These would be the distinctive qualities of what would later be called the
Bush Doctrine, and as Krauthammer put it: “the Bush Doctrine is, essentially, a synonym
for neoconservative foreign policy.”189
This section will critique the basic elements of the Bush Doctrine. What makes
the Bush Doctrine so controversial are its underlying themes. There are four prominent
themes synonymous with the Bush Doctrine that Robert Jervis has highlighted. These
themes are democratization, militaristic primacy, preemption, and unilateralism. Below
is an explanation of each of these.

Democratization
Probably the most important theme of the Bush doctrine is its emphasis on democracy.
The introduction to National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)
began with the opening state:
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“The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism
ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable
model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”190
Democracy and freedom are justified, not only as the better way to govern, but because
democracy emerged victorious in “the great struggles”, an ideological struggle between
democracy and totalitiarism, deeming it as ideologically right. To further make this point
the NSS claims that “the United States must defend liberty and justice because these
principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”191 This statement, claiming
democracy’s ideological truth, transitions us to the next point, that it is true “for all
people everywhere”. It is not enough to merely practice democracy, it must be promoted
and exported. Written in the NSS is:
“Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the
benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of
democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the
world.”192
The Bush Doctrine holds democracy to be ‘true’ but more importantly universally ‘true’
which justifies the promotion of democracy across the globe. The Bush Doctrine goes
further, though, by translating this justification for the promotion of democracy into an
obligation. Bush said in an interview “that we understand history has called us into
action, and we're not going to miss this opportunity to make the world more peaceful and
more free.”193

Promoting democracy abroad is necessary to counter competing

ideologies in a world not yet completely receptive to democracy. The NSS writes:
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“Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been
challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants;
and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds
in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The
United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.”194
Attempts by the Bush Doctrine to put its democratic principles into practice can be
evidenced through the administration’s efforts to conduct free elections in Iraq. The
White House now claims that the objective of the Iraq war was to promote democracy in
the region, expecting a domino effects and the eventual collapse of undemocratic regimes
such as Iran and Syria. However, democratization can only take place through the use of
power, which leads to the second theme.

Militaristic Primacy
The Bush Doctrine recognizes America’s unmatched military power. “Today, the United
States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political
influence.”195 Again, this primacy is necessary for the security of freedom and peace.
“It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must
build and maintain our defense beyond challenge. Our military’s highest priority
is to defend the United States…The unparalleled strength of the United States
armed forces, and their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of
the world’s most strategically vital regions.”196
However, the Bush Doctrine is a departure from traditional foreign policies given its view
of what the role of America’s military is in the world. That role is no longer one that acts
as passive deterrence.
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“We know from history that deterrence can fail; and we know from experience
that some enemies cannot be deterred. The United States must and will maintain
the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—whether a state or non-state
actor.”197
Rather, the Bush Doctrine would use military strength as an agent of change. This is best
illustrated in the introduction to the National Security Strategy: “History will judge
harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”198 Here we witness the
enterprising nature of the Bush Doctrine through its advocacy to reshape the world. In its
ambitions and desires for transformation, the Bush Doctrine presents itself as a paradigm
shift in foreign policy, a departure from our more realist approach to world affairs.
Traditional foreign policy would promote democracy through trade or by example while
the Bush Doctrine would engage the U.S in an active and aggressive exportation of it.
The passivity of deterrence would be replaced with the employment of military might and
the right to engage preemptively.

Preemption
As states previously, the Bush Doctrine assumes that deterrence is not a solution to all
problems and may fail at times; “we know from experience that some enemies cannot be
deterred.” The Bush Doctrine, therefore, is willing to “exercise our right of self defense
by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against
our people and our country”. However, the Bush Doctrine’s notion of preemption border
along the lines of preventative warfare. Where preemption is a response to an obvious
threat to security and protected under international law, preventative warfare is an
attempt to stop a potential threat before it turns into one. This flirtation with prevention
is evidenced in this passage:
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“Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.”
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today’s adversaries.

Rogue states and terrorists do no seek to attack us using

conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of
terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction.”199
Despite the problems associated with prevention, such as calculating actual threats and
responding militarily to each one, the Bush Doctrine deems this to be necessary for its
own survival. “The United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”200

Unilateralism
The Bush Doctrine is indeed action oriented. However, it is sometimes difficult or even
impossible to move the rest of the international community to action. In such cases
where action is deemed necessary for survival, the Bush Doctrine holds the right to act
unilaterally. “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone”.201 This statement is clear
about the U.S.’s intentions concerning unilateral action when it deems appropriate. It
claims that unilateralism is effective when diplomatic efforts fail. This theme also works
well with preemptive strategies because multilateral approval for preemption is difficult
to reach.
Overall, the Bush Doctrine is incredibly Wilsonian, but as Mearsheimer put it,
“Wilsonian with teeth”. To achieve its ends, it believes in the use of strength thus “it is
time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength” and to “build and
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maintain our defenses beyond challenge”.202 Such militaristic primacy would allow the
U.S. to address the threats of the 21st century, more specifically those who “hate the
United States and everything for which it stands” and “harbor, support, and use terrorism
to achieve their political goals”. Now the enemy looks and works differently, they are
“shadowing networks of individuals that can bring great chaos and suffering to our
shores”203, it is justified to use preemptive, even preventative, strikes.

However,

adjusting to these new threats may take time and other states may not agree with the use
of preemption, in which case the U.S. “should not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to
exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against terrorists”.204 These
measures provide the teeth for the Bush Doctrine, but at its core is its Wilsonianism, its
idealism, and the assumption that these ideals are absolute and universal. It is the end of
the Bush Doctrine to “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe.”205

Relating the Bush Doctrine to Neoconservatism
It is important to understand the Bush Doctrine as a departure from traditional more
realist approaches to foreign policy. After the turn of the millennium we witnessed new
realities and horrors of security outside any model’s predictive capacity with the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the War on Terror. What was needed was a paradigm
shift, a new approach to foreign policy that could address the threats of the 21st century
by understanding the source of those threats as a clash of ideals. The NSS claims that,
“For most of the twentieth century, the world was divided by a great struggle over ideas”,
which paints conflict between nations as conflict between ideologies. This document’s
view of history paints the current conflict the same way by saying “this is a struggle of
ideas and this is an area where America must excel.”
Neoconservatives found that Bush was quite open about his ideals dictating his
foreign policy.

This was refreshing given their disenchantment with his father’s

realpolitik inclinations. Thomas Donnelly, deputy director for the PNAC, was more than
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happy to hear Bush speak of “American hegemony” and the “Victory of American
ideals”. He said that “It is encouraging to hear a political leader who does not shy from
the responsibilities of preeminence”206 This exposes what is at the heart of the Bush
Doctrine, that which makes it different from previous more realist approaches, that which
makes it neoconservative – that being its shifting focus away from reality and toward
morality.

Consistent with its previous hostility towards détente and realpolitik, the

neoconservative architects would frame security struggles of the 21st century as
ideological. The Bush Doctrine would shift politics from the reality of balance of power
phenomena into the moral. Morality was no longer exogenous but rather central to policy
decisions and self-legitimating.
Such moral imperatives could be cited in Bush’s State of the Union Address,
claiming that Iraq, Iran and North Korea “constitute an axis of evil”.207 Later that year
with his commencement speech at West Point he stated:
“Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language
of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods,
but not different moralities.”
The rhetoric of the Bush Doctrine denotes not only a moral authority but an obligation to
uphold its virtues. In sum, Robert Kaufman states it best in his Defense of the Bush
Doctrine that conformity to ‘moral democratic realism’ is justified through the “cardinal
virtue of prudence, as St. Thomas Aquinas defined it – “right reason about things to be
done” – ought to serve as the standard for evaluating the best practicable American grand
strategy.”208
Such moral guidance can be evidenced in U.S. foreign policy towards Iraq. Bush
would engage Iraq outside of balance of power realities. The Bush Administration, and
the neoconservatives outside of it, directed their hostility at Saddam in such a way that
206
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undermined traditional assumptions of heads-of-state as rational actors and engaged him
on moral grounds. Bush’s radio address on March 15th 2003 would state: “We know
from recent history that Saddam Hussein is a reckless dictator who has twice invaded his
neighbors without provocation -- wars that led to death and suffering on a massive
scale.”209 Later on March 17th Bush would state: “Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi
regime have failed again and again -- because we are not dealing with peaceful men.”210
Many neoconservatives, such as William Kristol, Joshua Muravchek, Charles
Krauthammer, Robert Kagan, etc, were vocal about their support for an invasion,
describing Saddam as suicidal, irrational, and evil.

As Mearsheimer, a critic of

neoconservatism, describes it: “[Neoconservatives] believe that the world devides into
good states and bad states, and that the democracies are the white hats.”211 By painting
the world into good and bad the neoconservatives leave it void of rationality and
calculation, making it possible to describe Saddam as a “reckless dictator” or as thwarting
“peaceful efforts.”

This leads to the Bush Doctrines prescription – that being its

Wilsonianism.
On March 16th, Bush stated that after the removal of Saddam that we would be:
“committed to the goal of a unified Iraq, with democratic institutions of which members
of all ethnic and religious groups are treated with dignity and respect.”212 On March 22nd
Bush stated on a radio address to the nation that the mission of Operation Iraqi Freedom
is: “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for
terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”213 Democratization, for the Bush Docrtrine, as
well as neoconservatives, works as a panacea.

More importantly, democratization

allowed for neoconseravtive, as it did in the Cold War, to frame the Iraq war into an
ideological one. According to Norman Podheretz, the Iraq War is World War IV (the
Cold War was three) and just how WW III was ideological, so too is this war. The Iraq
209
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war, for neoconservatives, is not America versus Iraq but rather democracy versus
Islamofascism. The neoconservatism in the Bush Doctrine inclined to frame the war
morally and ideologlically.

Neoconservatism’s militant valorization of American

traditions would materialize through the Bush Doctrine’s ideological and political nature
as well as its inclination towards democratization.
Here we understand that at the core of, not just the Bush Doctrine, but
neoconseravtive foreign policy in general, is a fusion of idealism and realism. The policy
celebrates the American tradition where its moral authority is derived from its
juxtoposition from the “other”. The ideological world that Strauss has illustrated from
Schmitt demands this celebration of traditions unless we are to welcome relativism. Thus
we understand why a security strategy would be “based on the distinctively American
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests”, which
nonetheless, exemplifies how regime guides foreign policy.

However, the fear of

relativism translates these Wilsonian values as absolute and therefor non-negotiable.
This point is important in noting why the neoconservatism resists modern notions of
legitimacy.

Why Neoconservatism Resists Legitimation
The U.S. legal argument for military action demonstrates instrumental action, most
obvious through its assault on ‘truthfulness’. This is because the Bush Doctrine does not
see international legitimation as necessary but rather governs according to its own moral
absolutism which is self-legitimating. The Bush Doctrine, organized ideologically and
around moral imperatives, when informing the administration’s decision-making, would
thus filter ideology and morality into their policies. Frank Gaffney wrote:
“The reality is that the same moral principles that underpinned the Bush appeal on
‘values’ issues like gay marriage, stem-cell research, and the right to life were
central to his vision of U.S. war aims and foreign policy.”214
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This is an important statement that “moral principles” were central to “U.S. war aims and
foreign policy”? It is thus important to reiterate what the “moral principles” (or idealism)
of the Bush Doctrine are, those being its Wilsonian nature and its emphasis on
democratiziation.

In other words, The Bush Doctrine assumed the universality of

democracy for all. Under such assumptions of the Bush Doctrine, democracy should then
be exported to where it is absent, which would entail regime change.
The idea of regime change in Iraq was not a new idea to neoconservatives.
William Kristol and Robert Kagan wrote a letter representing the interests of the Project
for a New American Century (PNAC) to Bill Clinton in 1998. This letter outlined the
case for preemptively attack Iraq by warning Clinton that the “policy of ‘containment’ of
Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months” and proposed
the “removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power.”215 This letter was signed by
many neoconservatives among who many would serve in George W. Bush’s
administration including, Elliot Abrams, Richard Armitage, John Bolton, Zalmay
Khalizad, Richard Pearle, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld.

All of these

individuals, once appointed to serve under the president would turn regime change into a
very real possibility.

These foreign policy advisors “played right into his [Bush’s]

thinking” according to McClellan.216
“That was certainly the case with Iraq.

Bush was ready to bring about regime

change, and that in all likelihood meant war. The question now was not whether,
but merely when and how.
Although I didn’t realize it at the time we launched our campaign to sell the war,
what drove Bush toward military confrontation more than anything else was an
ambition and idealistic post-9/11 vision of transforming the Middle East through
the spread of freedom”217
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James Mann’s account of the Bush administration’s decision-making wrote that even if
Saddam Hussein “handed over large amounts of chemical and biological weapons stocks,
this would not have been sufficient” to stop an invasion. Mann also reported Khalilzad
answering what the conditions for refraining from an invasion would be, Khalilzad
answered: “it was literally that Saddam Hussein would have to leave the country.”218
What is important to note is that regime change was a major ambition driving the
decision to invade, but what is more important is the reason for regime change; the most
obvious choices for the American regime to translate its sense of morality into foreign
policy was through Wilsonian idealism and democratization.
This can be evidenced when Bush compared the Iraq war as modern “moral
equivalent” to the war against the Japanese imperialism during WWII. Bush compared
the success of Japans democracy to the possible success of Iraq’s democracy but does so
through the lens of morality. He argues it was not only the pragmatic thing to do but the
moral thing to do.219 In general Bush has stated several times, when asked about the Iraq
war he said that “it was the right thing to do” and that “I didn’t sacrifice my core beliefs
to satisfy critics or satisfy pundits.”220
However, the Bush Doctrine’s sense of moral rightness is based on such an
absolutism that it trumps legality. Ari Fleischer said, in response to Kofi Annan warning
the U.S. to abide by the UN charter, that “from a moral point of view” the UN should
support the United States. Richard Pearle first stated when Baghdad fell that ''a general
recognition that high moral purpose has been achieved here.”221

He would later

acknowledge that the war in Iraq was in fact illegal but this did not change his attitude.
He said, “I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right
thing.”222
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What Perle has illustrated in the previous statement is the reason why
neoconservatism is incompatible with the legitimation process. For him ‘law’ stood in
the way of ‘right’.

As the previous chapters have illustrated, neoconservatism has

inhereted a Straussian fear of relativism and as a result has affirmed time and again a
moral absolutism through culture to counter relativism.

However, the international

legitimation of law requires democratic deliberation to take place where participants
bargain and compromise on a sense of right. For neoconservatism however, consensus is
not necessary to determine a sense of right. Krauthammer has siad:
“But when some nations are not with you on your enterprise, including them in
your coalition is not a way to broaden it; it’s a way to abolish it.
At which point, liberal internationalists switch gears and appeal to legitimacy--on
the grounds that multilateral action has a higher moral standing. I have always
found this line of argument incomprehensible. By what possible moral calculus
does an American intervention to liberate 25 million people forfeit moral
legitimacy.”223
Rather for neoconservatism such a process exposes the absense of absolutism, or that if
any does exist it does so only within a human capacity and carry no universal or
transcendant weight, which means no weight at all. John Bolton demonstrated this when
he said that, “There is no such thing as the United Nations. There is only the international
community, which can only be led by the only remaining superpower, which is the
United States.”224 For Bolton, the UN is nothing but a “mindless creation”. This further
illustrates the suspicions of liberalism through hostility towards egalitarianism. Not only
does neoconservatism argue virtue to be independent of human creation but also that the
U.S. is the only nation invested with such virtue, which explains American
exceptionalism and the right of the U.S. to act according to its virtues without consent of
the international community. This exceptionalism parallels the cultural elitism necessary
223
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for transmitting myths to the masses, except this is projected on the international stage.
Muravchik argues for such elites in the world otherwise egalitiarian imperatives allow the
extreme and radical to influence the world. He claims that the UN will never take a stand
on terrorism because the Organization of the Islamic Conference contitutes 30% of UN
membership.225
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Conclusion
The main argument of the paper was to explain how and why the Bush Doctrine
undermined the UN in the decision to invade Iraq. The 'how' was explained by
demonstrating that the U.S. legal argument for war could not satisfy validity dimensions
required to reach understanding and consensus. Furthermore, the U.S. was in outright
breach of the charter when it decided to invade Iraq without a second resolution. The
'why' demonstrated that the Bush Doctrine, as a neoconservative document, has inherited
philosophical anxieties concerning moral relativism, and by extension, projects a war on
modernity that casts doubts on liberalism and attempts to reestablish ancient modes of
power and control.
To summarize, chapter one introduced the concept of legitimacy and
demonstrated how the Bush Doctrine has resisted against modern legitimation processes.
Chapter two introduced Strauss's modern problem and his prescription to empower
educated elites so that they may bring order to the masses through particular notions of
truth. Chapter three linked these Straussian philosophies to the neoconservative
movement by exposing neoconservative fears of relativism. Chapter four then evidenced
how this neoconservative movement climbed to power in the White House and provided
the basic principles for the Bush Doctrine. This chapter then concluded by demonstrating
how a foreign policy that harbors anxieties of relativism, outright resists collective efforts
in the legitimation of international rules and action. Resistance takes place through the
inability of neoconservatism to meet validity requirements due to its efforts to reestablish
its moral particularism as universal.
The prospect of a future neoconservative doctrine having the ability to engage
properly in a legitimation process is weak. What makes a doctrine distinctively
neoconservative is that it projects a war on modernity on the international level which
comprehends legitimacy in pre-modern terms, thus it works to reestablish ancient
structures of power and control. However, a good amount of the world has seemed to
embrace our modern project and doesn't desire history to reverse itself.
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The election of President Obama marks America's petition for change, and while
this new initiative is a departure from the Bush era, the foreign policy community can
expect a reconstitution of the neoconservative movement. Robert Kagan's and William
Kristol's new Foreign Policy Initiative is a new and ambitious foreign policy organization
ready to assert its agenda on the world stage which demonstrates persistence in the
neoconservative movement.
Neoconservatism

is

not

dead

and

Podhoretz's

eulogy

is

premature.

Neoconservatism, at the apex of its power in the Bush White House, transformed
America and worked to reshape the world in its image. The country must then reflect on
the consequences of this intellectual persuasion. An American foreign policy that
assumes exceptionalism, acts unilaterally, and exacerbates hostilities between nations, not
only undermines its own mission to share democracy abroad, but it isolates itself from the
modern world it hopelessly tried to undo.
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